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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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15 March 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Romanian-Hungarian Polemics Over Transylvania Reviewed
(Viktor Meyer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 29 Dec 84) 1

ALBANIA

- Session on Hoxha's Book at Tirana University
(ATA, 14 Feb 85) 4
- Country Hit by New Cold Wave
(ATA, 19 Feb 85) 5

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Austrian Opposition to Hainburg Viewed
(Ulrich Perzinger; PRAVDA, 16 Feb 85) 6
- Briefs
Czech Attache Receives Sentence 9

HUNGARY

- Western Anti-Hungarian Propaganda Viewed
(Jozsef Palfy; NEW TIMES, No 6, Feb 85) 10
- 'Invisible Economy': Income From Tips, Payoffs Considerable
(Ildiko Ekes; HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 1 Dec 84) 14
- Reports on Hungarian Reforms
(DIE PRESSE; ARBEITER-ZEITUNG, 19 Feb 85) 19
- Briefs
GDR Minister Visits 21
Serbian Hungarians Visit 21
Afghan Patriotic Front Delegation 21
SRV Deputy Premier Visits 22

POLAND

Warsaw Press Comments on U.S.-USSR Middle East Talks (Franciszek Malinowski; PAP, 19 Feb 85)	23
Creation of Constitutional Tribunal Debated (Stanislaw Podemski; POLITYKA, No 52, 29 Dec 84)	24
Lublin Official Discusses Sociopolitical Trends, Reforms (Wieslaw Skrzydlo Interview; RZECZPOSPOLITA, various dates)	26
Wozniak Discusses Warsaw's Political, Economic Realities (Marian Wozniak Interview; ARGUMENTY, No 3, 20 Jan 85)	35
Legal Intricacies of Proposed Electoral Law Clarified (Maciej Urbaniak; ODRODZENIE, No 3, 20 Jan 85)	46
PZPR Daily Views 15th PCF Congress (Wlodzimierz Zralek; TRYBUNA LUDU, 15 Feb 85)	52
Catholic Intellectual Comments on Solidarity, Education (Czeslaw Strzeszewski Interview; PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, No 4, 27 Jan 85)	54
Polish Union Opposition to Minister on Price Hikes (Budapest Domestic Service, 24 Feb 85)	61
Preparation of Chemical Troops for Mass Destruction Conditions (Andrzej Kaczmarek; PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH, No 12, Dec 84)	62
Youth Union Chairman Interviewed on Union Influence (Jerzy Szmajdziński Interview; RZECZPOSPOLITA, 13 Feb 85)	66
Briefs	
New Undersecretary	68
Polish-Mongolian Cooperation	68
First Gomulka Museum	68
Weekly's New Editor in Chief	68

ROMANIA

Faulty Health Education Blamed for High Abortion Rate (V. Lisovschi, I. Dorobantu; VIATA MEDICALA, Nov 84)	69
Composition of Politburo Discussed by FRG Paper (Johann Georg Reissmueller; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 7 Jan 85)	76
Briefs	
Ministerial Personnel Changes	79

YUGOSLAVIA

Ivica Racan Discusses Stabilization Program, Party Problems (Ivica Racan Interview; DANAS, 18 Dec 84)	80
Prosecutor in 'Dachau Trials' Denies Responsibility (J. Pjevic; BORBA, 1 Feb 85)	89

ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN POLEMICS OVER TRANSYLVANIA REVIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 29 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Viktor Meyer: "Budapest and Bucharest are no Longer Hiding Tensions"]

[Text] Hungary's and Romania's communist governments barely bother to hide the sharpening of tensions that exist between them. It was learned that Romania is urging its neighbor, Yugoslavia, to increase the turn-around capacity of the railroad border crossing at Vrsac (Werschetz), in the Banat, in order to do justice to the increasing Romanian transit traffic. The Romanians seem to fear that one of these days Hungary could create difficulties for their transit traffic towards the West. Now they seem to be making efforts to increase use of connections through Yugoslavia. Observers remember that in the summer of 1979 Romania established the precedent for possible Hungarian actions, when it permitted gasoline sales to foreigners against foreign exchange alone without advance notice [to Hungary], causing chaotic conditions on the Hungarian side of the border. The Hungarian bus traffic to Transylvania was almost cut off by the same action.

Current tensions lie in the fact that Hungary can no longer accept, in consideration of its publicity, the way the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, which officially stands at 1.7 million, is being treated. This is true for the grave financial situation as well as the cultural one. With regard to the latter, including the cultural exchange broken off by the Romanians, there was a series of initial contacts between high party and state officials of both countries which, however, did not bring any results, as it was announced in Budapest. The Hungarian union leader and erstwhile Budapest party secretary Mehes was present at the last Romanian party convention in Bucharest as an official delegate. Thereupon, he embarked on the new Hungarian policy of making public their dissatisfaction with Romania's conduct. Mehes was allowed, as customary, to speak in Bucharest in front of a "working group". However, the audience was limited to a small number of people, the majority of which were obviously secret policemen. Mehes sarcastically gave thanks for "the numerous and select audience" and said that the realization of the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority was not currently "at a peak".

The Romanians, who in 1982 had already increased the polemics about the past of Transylvania with publications by the author Lancranjan, replied with a two-part article in the magazine "ROMANIA LITERARA", which was directed against the Hungarian publications on contemporary history. "ROMANIA LITERARA" wrote in its first article that the Hungarian magazine "KRITIKA" acclaimed the attitude of the Hungarian Minister of War of the time, Vilmos Nagy, in 1943, as being "patriotic", when he demanded withdrawal of Hungarian troops from the Eastern Front in order to use them for the protection of areas "regained" according to the Vienna agreement or in some other way. The Viennese agreement in 1940 had returned to Hungary the northern part of Transylvania, which had been given to Romania in 1918. In the second article, "ROMANIA LITERARA" turned against allegedly positive judgments in Hungary about the politician Istvan Bibó who, like the writer Gyula Illyés, had suggested a so-called "third road" for Hungary during the post-war period and who had thereby, demanded new settlements for Transylvania.

"ROMANIA LITERARA" 's dark polemic against alleged Hungarian intentions to conclude a "new treaty" for Transylvania with Romania possibly means a rejection of the recent Hungarian attempts to reach binding agreements with Romania about the status of the minority and cultural exchange. With the 1944 recapture of Transylvania by the Romanians and the Soviets, "ROMANIA LITERARA" explains, Transylvania's status was decided and the 1947 peace treaty completely annulled the Vienna agreement. Whoever talks about "new treaties" is conducting "revanchist politics".

The problem of minority agreements raised by "ROMANIA LITERARA" has its roots in the time immediately after World War I. As a condition for assigning Transylvania to Romania in the Trianon agreement, the Allies at that time demanded that Romania sign a minority protection agreement. Romania had to agree to this condition on 9 December 1919. The agreement, which was absorbed as an Annex in the Trianon Peace Treaty and was to be monitored later by the League of Nations, not only insured equal rights for Hungarian and other minorities in Romania, but also the right to separate institutions for welfare, culture, schooling, and religion. If Romania, as "ROMANIA LITERARA" sees it, wants to regard the 1920 Trianon agreement as valid and confirmed by the 1947 Peace Treaty, then [Romania] should recognize the minority protection agreement.

Ceausescu Uncompromising in Minority Politics

During the last few weeks the Hungarian side has endeavored to describe Petru Groza, Romanian Prime Minister between 1945 and 1952, as an example of sympathetic nationality politics in contrast to the present rulers. Groza, a Romanian estate owner from Deva in Transylvania, who opportunistically joined the Communists and supported their seizure of power in Romania, would have been 100 years old now. Actually, he may have really played a certain role in the normalization of conditions in Northern Transylvania when Romania regained it in 1944. After the award of Vienna and Hungary's invasion of this area, there were excesses against the Romanian population; after the reoccupation by the Romanians there were excesses against the Hungarian population. This caused the Soviets to withdraw administration of Northern Transylvania from the Romanians in November 1944. Many observers are of the opinion that the

Soviets wanted to link the conclusive return of Transylvania to Romania with the early formation of a "popular front government". Actually, the Romanian administration was reinstated in Northern Transylvania in March 1945. Groza had a part in the creation, at least in form, of a "Hungarian Autonomous Region" with Tirgu Mures as its capital. The Hungarian Autonomous Region disappeared completely in 1968.

The Hungarian government will not accept a visit by Ceausescu to Hungary until an improvement in the situation becomes apparent and Romania complies with its obligations according to Hungary's belief, which were agreed upon during Ceausescu's and Kadar's last meeting in 1977 in Debrecen and Oradea Mare (Grosswardein). The uncompromising politics of Ceausescu's government with regard to the Hungarian minority and the Hungarian state threatens to increase Romania's isolation. In spite of frequent reciprocal state visits, relations between Romania and Bulgaria are not very good, either. Work on the jointly planned Danube power station near Nikopol has been stopped. Yugoslavia had cause to complain about the condition of the Serbian minority in Romania. On the occasion of Ceausescu's last visit to Bonn, he refused to consent to mention the German minority in a final statement.

12521

CSO: 2300/260

SESSION ON HOXHA'S BOOK AT TIRANA UNIVERSITY

AU141220 Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 14 Feb 85

[Text] Tirana, 14 Feb (ATA)--The party committee of Tirana University and the Faculty of Political and Juridical Sciences organized yesterday a scientific session on the work by Comrade Enver Hoxha "Laying the Foundations of the New Albania."

Attending were the alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and first secretary of the Tirana District Party Committee, Comrade Foto Cami, the rector of the Tirana University, Prof Osman Kraja and other comrades.

The following reports were read out in the session: "The Work by Comrade Enver Hoxha--An Outstanding Work of the Marxist-Leninist Science" by Prof Zija Xholi, "The Struggle of the Party Against the Groups and Current Bearers of the Foreign Influences" by Prof Arben Puto, "The Denouncement of the False Accusations of the Yugoslav Revisionists Against our Party for a Sectarian Stand" by Prof Bujar Hoxha, "The Culture of the Artistic Language-Special Values of the Work by Comrade Enver-Hoxha" by Tefik Caushi and "The Masses and the Individual--the Role and Their Collaboration" by Ismail Lleshi.

The speakers in the session pointed out the major ideological and scientific values of this work. They dealt with a number of problems regarding the objective and subjective factors of the triumph of our people in the antifascist National Liberation War. Emphasis was also laid on the mature and wise stand of our party towards the treacherous organisations and the interferences by the Anglo-American imperialists, a stand which brought about the destruction of these organisations, the failure of the attempts of the imperialists and the constant strengthening of the unity of the people round the party in the National Liberation Front, the establishment of the people's state power in Albania.

CSO: 2020/73

COUNTRY HIT BY NEW COLD WAVE

AU191355 Tirana ATA in English 0800 GMT 19 Feb 85

[Text] Tirana, 19 Feb (ATA)--Over recent days our country has been in the grip of an unstable weather, with low temperatures and continued snow showers in many districts, especially in the northern and north-eastern regions.

According to the recent information, in the cities of Bajram Curri, Puka and Peshkopi the snow is respectively 40, 45 and 62 cm, while in the cities of Burrel, Shkoder, Rreshen and Kukes, the snow level has reached 17 to 28 cm. The snow showers have been more frequent in some remote mountain zones of these districts such as in Shishtavec, and Shemri of Kukes, in Nikaj, Mertur and Dragobi of Tropoja, etc where snow level is over 1-1.2 meters.

Low temperatures falling up to minus 16 degrees celsius have been recorded over these days. Thus, in Kukes the lowest temperature has reached minus 10 degrees and the highest minus 5.6 degrees whereas in Peshkopi the temperatures have been respectively minus 11 and minus 7.2 degrees celsius. The snow showers have occasionally continued during yesterday.

As a result of the freeze which has created ice layers, the movement has been halted in some national highways such as those linking Bajram Curri and Kukes with Fushe Arrez.

The residents of the cities and regions affected by bad weather are engaged in the work to clean up the snow from the roads, the roofs of the houses, of the social and cultural objects, and the stables.

CSO: 2020/73

AUSTRIAN OPPOSITION TO HAINBURG VIEWED

AU191510 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Feb 85 p 4

[Article written for PRAVDA by Ulrich Perzinger from the paper VOLKSSTIMME, Vienna: "For a Generally Acceptable Alternative; the 'Hainburg Affair' Has Become an 'Affair of Democracy'"]

[Text] Until recently Austria was known abroad primarily as a country endowed with rich nature, with forests and mountain massifs; but this was only up to 19 December 1984. On that day pictures flickered over the television screens showing policemen with truncheons who had been ordered by the Federal Government--headed by the [word indistinct] Democrats--to expel by force thousands of environmentalists from the lowland forests near Hainburg in order that the construction of the largest Austrian hydroelectric power station on the Danube could begin.

But even the police did not succeed in breaking down the resistance of thousands of environmentalists. For a full 4 weeks they occupied this Danube area, which resembles a primeval forest and is unique in Europe, and forced the builders of the electric power station to a temporary withdrawal.

The government has had to declare that, for the time being, no preparatory or construction work would be carried out there. But since the Ministry of Agriculture had decreed that grubbing work can be carried out only in December or January, in order not to disturb animals and the vegetation, this means a postponement of at least 1 year.

At the beginning of January 1985 the Federal Government announced an 11-point plan stipulating that this period will be used for deliberations on new places for building the electric power station; but that, on principle, one "is holding on to the electric power station near Hainburg." Furthermore, the government has decided that preparations should begin for building a dam near Vienna, and that further measures should be discussed for employing the construction workers affected by the decision.

The Austrian Communist Party (KPOE) has been demanding such and similar measures for quite a long time, and regards this government decision as a success of its activities. The decision proves that the Communists have been representing a realistic policy, which it was possible to assert in Hainburg with the aid of appropriate pressure and jointly with the environmentalist movement.

The "social partners," who have turned Hainburg into a symbol of their ability to govern, have suffered a temporary defeat. They have failed, in the face of the broad public resistance to the arbitrary and undemocratic course pursued by the government and the representatives of the social partnership. On the other hand, the experience acquired by environmentalists in the conflict over the location of the electric power station is of great political significance.

Whereas at the beginning of the "Hainburg affair" the issue was merely to save the unique riverside areas which scarcely exist any more in Europe, the culmination of this conflict produced the "affair of democracy."

The decision-making process on the project of the planned electric power station is a textbook example of an undemocratic course embarked upon by the so-called social partnership--which is a system of cooperation between the representatives of industry, the trade unions, and politicians.

Even before the conference of the DOKW company (Danube Electric Power Stations) had reached an official decision, contracts were being handed out to construction firms. The chiefs of the electric power sector, 95 percent of which is owned by the state, were accustomed to doing what they pleased. At first it seemed as though things would also be the same with regard to this project. The DOKW plan was accepted by the government without any criticism, and Federal Chancellor Sinowatz declared in Spring 1983: "The Hainburg electric power station will be built."

However, this time the project met with organized resistance. A citizen's initiative helped to collect 150,000 signatures; and the public was informed about the extent of the planned destruction of the living environment. Scarcely a day passed without the adversaries of the electric power station being accused of threatening job opportunities and the supply of electric power to the country. Although almost all prominent Austrian experts and scientists had voiced their opposition to Hainburg, the government stubbornly adhered to the project and strove to incite the workers against the movement of environment protectors.

Although the law on environmental protection in Lower Austria unambiguously bans the construction of electric power stations in the designated area near Hainburg; although the government had signed two international agreements in 1983--in Bern and in Ramsar--which call the Hainburg forest an internationally protected area; and although three responsible district representatives of the communities concerned refused in the first instance to issue a building permit, the Ministry of Agriculture and the provincial government of Lower Austria did issue it. This represented an unambiguous violation of the law; and it happened only because the critical experts had been excluded and a part of the experts' opinions ordered had been falsified.

The Austrian public felt all the greater indignation when the government wanted to drive the people out of the lowland forests with the help of brute police force, in order—as it claimed—to assert law and order. That very law which unambiguously stood on the side of the environmentalists.

The government backed away only at the beginning of January, and only after having deployed the police under pressure from the leadership of trade unions and industry—an act which horrified people abroad, as well as within the country itself.

Thus, the discussion about the Hainburg electric power station will continue this year, too. But now it will be conducted on a different level. The environmentalists saw light on the cold December nights on the Danube; and they realized who reigns in Austria, and how.

Obviously, this movement of nature protectors still bears the stamp of attitudes which are hostile to technology; it includes many people who are generally opposed to all large electric power stations.

But the people have begun to think about it; they are voicing many correct demands, for instance demands for a democratization of the energy economy and for a basic verification of the acceptability of new electric power stations from the viewpoint of living environments. In its statement of attitude toward Hainburg, the KPOE stresses that—despite the participation of conservative forces—the movement of nature protectors is a generally democratic movement. Franz Muhri, KPOE chairman, later stated: "The recent events in Austria have shown that the issues of environment protection have an increasing significance. The same applies to the movement for resolving them. We Communists are in favor of solutions and alternatives which equally serve the demands for ensuring job opportunities and the demands for protecting living environments. A general rejection of Danube electric power stations, and the ignoring of worries about the ensurance of job opportunities in the environmentalist movement on the one hand, and the failure to take into account the justified demands for environmental protection on the other hand, would merely lead toward deepening the split. Such stances objectively benefit those conservative and reactionary forces which want to direct the growing dissatisfaction politically, for the right-winger's benefit.

The Communists' attitude is clear and unambiguous:

The KPOE is in favor of the best possible utilization of water energy as the purest power resource.

The KPOE is against locating the electric power station at Hainburg; but it is in favor of a construction project on the Danube near Vienna, which would equally serve the demands for power supplies, the ensurance of job opportunities, and the justified demands for environmental protection. The joint project with the CSSR—the Wolfsthal-Bratislava project—which was planned originally, but which was later dropped despite the CSSR's willingness, obviously for political reasons—is exactly this kind of alternative to Hainburg.

CSO: 2400/287

BRIEFS

CZECH ATTACHE RECEIVES SENTENCE--It was learned from very reliable sources on 18 February in Prague a former Czech military attache in France, Mr Frantisek Vojtasek, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for espionage. The same sources added that Mr Frantisek Vojtasek appears to have been ordered to serve his sentence in a "category 3" prison, the harshest category. The date of his sentencing is not known. The only indication provided thus far by the press was an announcement on 4 July 1978 by the CTK agency that a case had been lodged against Mr Vojtasek under an article of the penal code applying to individuals holding a very high-level government clearance. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Feb 85 p 3]

CSO: 3619/58

WESTERN ANTI-HUNGARIAN PROPAGANDA VIEWED

PM151457 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 6, Feb 85 pp 14-15

[Article by Jozsef Palfy: "Now It's Done: Methods of Anti-Hungarian Psychological Warfare"]

[Text] Like other socialist countries, the Hungarian People's Republic is a frequent target of instigatory imperialist propaganda campaigns. The very legitimacy of our social system, the very existence of our state are called in question, which, apart from everything else, is tantamount to a revision of postwar history. As before, every attempt is made to undermine socialism from within. For instance, there were hopes in the West that Hungary would follow "the Polish example." Before long, however, the anti-communists had to part with these hopes as they saw that the demagogic policy of solidarity and other counter-revolutionary groups enjoyed little support in Hungary.

There is a fondness in the West for talk about the existence of "dissidents" and "opposition" in Hungary. Not infrequently, appeals are made to render them aid and support. As far as Hungary is concerned, its 10 million people know that this could only apply to minuscule groups that have neither influence nor following.

Bourgeois propaganda prefers to differentiate its approach to socialist countries. In the case of Hungary, for example, the most common method is deliberate exaggeration of the difference between its economic practices and those of other socialist countries. There are distinctions, to be sure, in the way we tackle the economic problems that arise, but they cannot be qualified as fundamental differences either in form or in essence. To do so is to deliberately misrepresent the substance of relations among the socialist countries.

The bourgeois media are not averse to recognizing Hungary's economic successes. But how do they do it? Our achievements are presented as the positive results of our "deviation from the socialist road." And catchy political labels like "red capitalism" are invented on the spot.

Another--diametrically opposite--method is to ferret out and play up Hungary's difficulties, all of which of course are attributed to the nature of socialism. The Hungarian press, radio and television frankly expose shortcomings and errors and sharply criticize them. And this fully accords with the policy and practice of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. But what is the attitude of Hungary's Western "friends" in this respect? They either ignore our uncompromising stand as regards our own errors or mistake self-criticism for "the voice of the opposition."

Western propaganda also tries to disrupt the normal relations that have taken shape between the state and the church. There are practically no disputed issues between the socialist state and the Church in our country. The rights of the Roman Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran churches are not impinged upon in any way. Dr Zoltan Kaldy, the Lutheran bishop, is a deputy to the Hungarian National Assembly. He does much to fulfill the mandate of his constituency. He was elected president of the authoritative Lutheran World Federation at its congress in Budapest. On the even of the congress the Western press unloosed torrents of abuse against Zoltan Kaldy. What it holds against him is his approval of the internationalist assistance the Soviet Union is rendering Afghanistan in defending the gains of its revolution, and his active involvement in the peace movement.

Cardinal Laszlo Lekai, the Catholic Primate of Hungary, is also on the receiving end of attacks. The self-same "friends" of Hungary are weaving webs of intrigue around him in an attempt to split the clergy.

Time after time, imperialist propaganda has demonstrated its adherence to the method of "lay it on thick, and something will stick." Let us cite one example of a slanderous attempt to discredit socialist Hungary.

A young man appeared on an American television programme. He spoke in English, but with a noticeable accent.

"My wife was a journalist back in Hungary," he said. She did not hide her hatred of communism and was in constant fear of being kidnapped. We managed to emigrate to the United States. But the Hungarian Communists kidnapped her even here, because she could make revelations that would be embarrassing to them."

This touched off another propaganda "sensation."

The woman's name was Katalin Ronaszeki. She had disappeared from a Washington motel on the eve of the telecast. "Eyewitnesses" appeared before the camera who said they had seen a "drugged" woman walking away from the motel escorted by an unidentified man. At the end of the programme the anchorman said, in a voice laden with significance: "Hungarian Embassy officials refused to comment on the disappearance of their compatriot."

After his appearance on television, the woman's husband gave an interview to THE WASHINGTON TIMES in which the kidnapped woman figured not just as an ordinary journalist but as "a former top Hungarian journalist" and said she had left her country because she "did not believe in the party's ideals."

The "kidnap sensation" lasted less than 24 hours and was ended by a policeman who said that Katalin Ronaszeki had been wandering aimlessly about Washington and he had thought it best to place her in a house for the homeless.

The woman herself later said that she walked in the street at night because of insomnia caused by despair over the futility of her existence. She had just been sacked from the Voice of America on grounds of professional incompetence.

The Washington papers reported the finding of the "kidnap victim" in small items printed in small type and with no mention of any "eyewitnesses" who had allegedly seen a "drugged" woman and her "kidnapper." Nor did they see fit to apologize to the Hungarian Embassy which had been accused of not wishing to "comment" on the disappearance of the Hungarian woman.

In Budapest we learned that the unfortunate woman--for that was what she was--had graduated from a school of journalism in Hungary a few years before. She could have taken up a career in Hungary but left the country at her husband's insistence. The incident is another dissident drama and its coverage in the American press is another Western propaganda stunt.

Hundreds of thousands of Western tourists come to Hungary every year. Among them as many Hungarian-born people visiting their relatives, and they invariably draw the close attention of the Western special services. The same special services subject Hungarians going abroad to massive brainwashing in order to use them for hostile purposes. This was highlighted in a Hungarian TV programme based on eyewitness accounts.

People from the socialist countries who travel to the West, said Csaba Balogh, a Hungarian citizen, are approached by so-called "compatriots" who, in exchange for various services, try to obtain information about political sentiments in the country, the military potential of the national armies and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and to gather material for slanderous radio broadcasts.

During his visit to West Germany in 1982, Balogh was directed by one such "well-wisher" to the so-called Tolstoy foundation where he was pumped for information about the kind of computer equipment used in Hungarian offices and in the armed forces, about other socialist countries he had visited and whether he had noticed any troop movements on their territories. Every such interrogation was rewarded with a "fee" of 50 West German marks. After extracting all the information they could, the Tolstoy Foundation people suggested that Balogh and several other Hungarian citizens return to Hungary to spy for the West.

All these facts testify to the massive subversion against the socialist countries engaged in by the Western special services, primarily the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

In spite of all these actions, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Hungarian Government do not consider it necessary to take administrative measures to reduce the number of tourists and curtail international exchanges. The aim of Hungarian policy is to ensure peaceful and favourable conditions for the building of socialism in Hungary. Together with the other socialist countries, Hungary stands for lessening international tensions and for greater mutual understanding.

But let no one in the West cherish the illusion of being able to oppose Hungary to the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. The record of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Hungarian Government clearly shows that we are moving along the socialist road in close alliance with the other socialist countries. We are actively promoting our relations with the Communist and Workers' parties in capitalist countries, with the national liberation movements and all anti-imperialist forces.

In keeping with the political line of the HSWP, the Hungarian mass media give detailed coverage to the building of socialism in the country. This is done without glossing over anything, without window dressing, in short, in such a way as to make Hungary's friends aware both of our achievements and the shortcomings that have to be removed.

We are acting vigorously to neutralize the harmful impact of imperialist propaganda. In opposing its attacks, we try to draw on the experience of the fraternal parties of other socialist countries.

In these months, as Hungary prepares to mark the 40th anniversary of its liberation, our people remember with gratitude the Soviet fighting men who liberated us and pay tribute to those of them who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism in Hungary.

Today we can counter the influence of imperialist propaganda by the common achievements of the countries of the socialist community whose interests are safeguarded by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The military might of the Warsaw Treaty countries, particularly of the Soviet Union is a countervailing force checking the aggressive designs of imperialism. We in Hungary are deeply convinced that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries are defending not only themselves but peace throughout the world.

CSO: 2020/70

'INVISIBLE ECONOMY': INCOME FROM TIPS, PAYOFFS CONSIDERABLE

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 1 Dec 84 pp 34-35

[Article by Ildiko Ekes: "Does It Smell?"]

[Text] Tip, palmed tip, gratuity, grease, bribe, fraud, embezzlement, usury Perhaps no other language in the world besides Hungarian has such a wide vocabulary of nuanced expressions for invisible incomes. It is common knowledge that they exist, and there is more and more talk about them. Only one mystery remains: How much money is actually involved?

A part of personal incomes originates in a way that can neither be measured statistically nor estimated. This is the case everywhere in the world, and our country is no exception. But such incomes are becoming the subject of economic investigations with increasing frequency.

There is a very wide variety of invisible incomes, but experts usually classify them into three groups. One group comprises the incomes that modify the officially formed income ratios and are tied to principal occupations: e.g., tips, palmed tips, and gratuities. The incomes in the second group are basically illegal and linked to some performance: e.g., money obtained by plying a trade without a license, from the sale of goods brought into the country in violation of customs and foreign-exchange regulations, through the unauthorized use of the socialist sector's materials and equipment to make goods or provide services on the side (such as unauthorized trucking), or through tax evasion (usually by private artisans and retailers). Finally, in the third group we may include the incomes obtained through trickery or the misuse of power and opportunity: bribery, fraud, embezzlement, loan-sharking, etc.

As evident from this classification as well, invisible incomes may include a very wide variety of income types, just as the reasons for their existence, their effects and, last but not least, our acceptance of them also vary widely. In the occupations where they are customary, for example, tips and gratuities are tacitly built into the wages and salaries. Thus if tips and gratuities were abolished suddenly, the manpower would immediately start to migrate from the jobs in question, because it would be unable to live on the officially established wages and salaries, or at least not on the standard of

living to which it has become accustomed. And since these activities are essential to society, very hefty wage increases would have to be given to stop the migration of manpower. The raises would hardly be possible without sharp increases in the prices of the goods and services in question. (There is, of course, no guaranty that the increased prices would be lower than the present prices, tips included.) Although there are some areas--for example, health care--where the recent public debates have produced ideas that more or less resolve these dilemmas (cf HETI VILAGGASZDASAG, No 42, 1984), most occupations in which tips and gratuities are customary have not yet received so much attention.

The incomes in the second group, obtained by doing some kind of work, are undoubtedly useful to society in the sense that the work in question creates new value and there is more performance within society. After all, even the work performed by an unlicensed artisan is work. On the other hand, however, the fact remains that the extra work done by the "private" craftsman might mean that he is holding back his performance on his regular job; that there is uncontrollable redistribution of incomes within society through the unauthorized use of publicly owned materials and equipment, at the enterprise's expense; and it is also no secret that the state is being deprived of tax revenue that could be used for the joint needs of society.

Finally, the existence of incomes in the third group is unambiguously harmful to society, because not only is there no performance behind them, but they clearly have a value-destroying effect.

Although the causes behind the existence of the individual types of incomes are very diverse, invisible incomes stem basically from three things. First, there is a shortage of some kind--of goods or skills. This makes possible such incomes as palmed tips, incomes from the sale of goods brought into the country in violation of customs and foreign-exchange regulations, and incomes from unlicensed trade. The second reason should be sought in the conditions under which the enterprises operate: in the frequent monopoly position of an enterprise and the absence of competition. For an enterprise's monopoly position enables the enterprise to offset its rising costs by raising its prices, and does not compel it to watch closely the development of its costs.

Inflationary pressure also should be mentioned as a reason for the existence of invisible incomes. Namely, the steady rise of consumer prices compels the population to seek additional sources of income to maintain its standard of living. When the population cannot augment its income from visible sources, it seeks other solutions. In the final outcome, this contributes to the expansion of the scope and volume of invisible incomes, partially because a compulsive behavior develops, and partially because ever newer income opportunities are "introduced."

One wonders how much is the total volume of invisible incomes in Hungary. Although many people would like to know, it is risky to give a definite answer. The international methods that have been developed to estimate invisible incomes still contain so many uncertainties that one cannot commit himself to any of them in clear conscience.

Monthly Average Tips and Proportion of Tips in Relation to Income (in Some Occupations in 1981, on the Basis of a Survey Conducted by the Trade Unions' Theoretical Research Institute)

Occupations	Average monthly official income (forints)	Average monthly tips (forints)	Percent of additional monthly in- come from tips
Parquet layer	4491.8	1606.3	36.7
Plumber, gas fitter	4549.9	730.8	16.3
Mason	4582.9	964.5	21.0
Interior decorator	4243.0	1050.0	24.0
Cabinetmaker	4974.9	593.8	12.2
Carpenter	5105.0	1100.0	21.5
Tinsmith	4776.0	600.0	12.6
Paver	4591.8	1312.5	29.1
Electrician	4079.3	586.3	13.7
Locksmith	4295.0	589.4	13.5
Roofer	4835.0	900.0	18.6
Instrument maker	6000.0	4375.0	72.9
Swimming instructor	4232.0	2000.0	47.2
Masseur	3213.0	2000.0	62.2
Physical therapist	3135.0	2000.0	63.7
Bath attendant	2469.0	2000.0	81.0
Hair dresser	3090.0	2062.5	66.7
Barber	2510.0	4840.0	192.8
Manicurist	1565.0	2550.0	162.9
Cosmetician	2907.0	2385.0	82.0
Cleaning woman	3600.0	1150.0	31.9
Window cleaner	3400.0	1856.3	54.6
Rug cleaner	3400.0	1856.3	54.6
Septic tank cleaner	4712.5	1399.8	15.1
Refuse collector	4800.0	800.0	16.6
Undertaker's office manager	3650.0	1250.0	34.2
Hearse driver	5298.5	1677.5	37.1
Funeral parlor attendant	4612.0	1320.0	28.6
Grave digger	4566.0	1046.3	22.9

Back in 1971, Andras Nyilas and Elemer Szamosvolgyi attempted to estimate only the tips and gratuities, in the occupations where tips and gratuities are the most typical. According to their computations at that time, the annual volume of such incomes in the investigated occupations was at least 2.0 to 3.0 billion forints. If we adjust this amount merely on the basis of the price indices for the years that have elapsed since then (because higher prices obviously mean bigger tips and gratuities), then today this volume could amount to between 7.0 and 8.0 billion forints.

Published in 1983, a study by the Central Statistical Office analyzing consumption habits in the use of consumer services contributes additional material for estimating the invisible incomes' order of magnitude. According to this study, the volume of services outside the organized framework approximates the volume

of the regular service industries. This includes also services usually provided by artisans, but supplied by home handymen. In 1980, the value of consumer services provided for the population was about 12 billion forints; if unlicensed artisans account for merely half of this amount, even that comes to 6.0 billion forints (admittedly it is gross income that includes operating costs).

But all this illuminates only certain spots in the very hazy picture of invisible incomes. In conjunction with many forms of invisible income, however, it is barely possible to even make estimates. Thus the total volume of invisible incomes in Hungary today could be substantially higher than the approximately 15 billion forints we have arrived at so far.

Contrary to general beliefs, however, most incomes do not result in a conspicuously high standard of living because, according to studies conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the differences in per capita incomes must be attributed primarily to differences in family size. It is obvious that in a large proportion of the cases, although not always, the higher income enables the family only to live on the average income level.

The giving and the acceptance or demanding of invisible incomes, the tips, bribes and "trade" in advantages at the expense of others, are not recent phenomena in Hungary; their economic, social and moral roots go back many centuries. What are the factors that have maintained, and in some instances even revived, these phenomena in recent decades is a separate question that requires urgent investigations by sociologists and politicians. The regulations that have launched small businesses and allowed more private enterprise were introduced two years ago. By providing opportunity to earn additional income legally, and by alleviating the shortages, these regulations are attempting to direct into visible channels a proportion of the invisible incomes. The statistics for the coming years will be able to show how successful the small businesses have been in this respect.

Briefly About Methods

In international statistical practice, experts have developed numerous methods for estimating the invisible incomes' order of magnitude, but they regard each alternative inadequate in some respect.

As also its name implies, the survey method usually means a questionnaire survey of a certain population sample, on whether they had invisible incomes and how much, and also whether they consume goods and services that indicate such incomes. But this method is entirely unsuitable for estimating certain types of income, e.g., tax evasion and bribes. The essence of the method of labor statistics is the assumption that a rise in unemployment means that more work is being done in the invisible economy, and therefore there is an increase in the unreported incomes from such work. But this approach fails to take into consideration the fact that some of the workers in the invisible economy are only moonlighting there.

The monetary method is based on the assumption that incomes from the invisible economy circulate in the form of cash, and from the increase in the amount of

currency in circulation it is therefore possible to draw conclusions regarding the magnitude of incomes in the invisible economy. But this method of estimation is ruled out in principle in an economy (such as the Hungarian one) where most of the circulation is in cash, and not in the form of credit money.

In the household statistics approach, two panels of households are formed that are nearly identical in their principal characteristics (income, occupation, family size, etc.). One panel is questioned only about its expenditures; the other, only about its income. If the spending reported by one panel exceeds the income reported by the other panel, the difference is supposed to indicate the amount of invisible incomes. However, the accuracy of the data depends to a large extent on the accuracy of the respondents, respectively on how much they spend on items society frowns upon (such as alcohol), the expenditures for which are therefore concealed or understated. So-called educated estimates start out from economic analyses of where invisible incomes can arise, how many persons share them, and to what extent. However, such estimates can be way off, because the entire population, with the exception of very small children, could be potential income earners. There are researchers who assume that income recipients conceal a proportion of their incomes from the tax collector. Thus the incomes reported to the tax authorities are smaller than what the input-output tables of the national accounts show, and the difference is invisible income. Hence this method is applicable only where there is a general obligation to file income tax returns. However, it is questionable even there, because the input-output tables of the national accounts are compiled to a large extent from the filed income tax returns.

1014

CSO: 2500 / 207

REPORTS ON HUNGARIAN REFORMS

AU200929 [Editorial Report] Vienna DIE PRESSE and ARBEITER-ZEITUNG on 19 February carry articles on the Hungarian economy and its economic reforms.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG in German on page 5 carries an about 1,100-word article "Second Economy: Atmosphere of a New Founding Period (Grunderzeit)," by Georg Hoffmann-Ostenhof, who refers in his article to the practice of the "secondary economy," which, he says, makes the Hungarian economy more flexible than other Eastern economies. The author refers to statements by Cseh-Szombathy, director of the sociological institute of the Academy of Sciences, that the second economy is "only playing a dominating role in rural areas and in smaller communities and cities" where about "60 percent are employed in the 'second economy,'" whereas in "urban centers and in industry only 150,000 people participate in the new labor organization form."

The author then refers to a statement by sociologist Tómes Kolosi, according to which "75 percent of the active population have a second income." The Hungarians, the author goes on, do not deny the disadvantages of the reform, like the fact that for many people purchasing power has decreased in the past years, an inflation rate of over 9 percent has been forecast for this year, the situation of the old-age pensioners has worsened, and people have to work more than 8 to 10 hours to maintain their living standard. He concludes by referring to the counterreform trends in Hungary and the statement by Cseh-Szombathy that "if there is not political reform, there will be a new 1973."

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German on 19 February on page 3 also carries an about 1,200-word article by its staff member Perer Martos on the Hungarian economy, entitled "Consumption Replacing Work and Pay Ethic." In it he cites statements by József Bognár, director of the Institute for World Economic Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in which he notes that "the main problem is to make the socialist sector more flexible" and that the private initiative must be promoted, where national organization does not function. According to the author, Bognár and the sociologist László Cseh-Szombathy agree that the advance of the private initiative has created problems like in the field of working time and the formation of two categories, that is, "Those who have the possibility of a second job and those who do not," Martos continues: "The economic expert and the sociologist deny that there are ideological reservations. To the question how excessive work can be brought in line with the claim for leisure time Bognár replies: 'One cannot control a society to such an extent that it meets the socialist theses; the

Hungarians want money rather than leisure time.' Cseh-Szombathy states evasively: 'It is impossible to demand only sacrifices from the people for over 40 years!' His institute is at present working on a new sociopolitical concept for the government it is reported. Basic thesis of the sociologist: 'The compatriots need the satisfaction of their fundamental needs,' only then can they be taught 'social awareness.'"

Martos then gives a number of examples of the development of private initiative in Hungary, which, he says, is most decisive in agriculture, stresses the consumer mindedness of the people, which in Hungary is called "economic orientation," he notes, and then writes in this context: "It is precisely this attitude that the sociologist Cseh-Szombathy wants to see changed 'The leadership has not excluded the people from the process of political decisions--the reality was: the Party leads, we want to consume.' This will change with the increase of economic plurality. Gradually organizations representing interests--first in the form of associations--are developing which partly assume the role as partners of the authorities, which the trade unions have never mastered. Cseh-Szombathy also sees a sort of direct democracy coming up: apartment house communities are beginning to be interested in housing policy, vocational groups are trying to get support from lawyers and so on. His institute is regarded not only as pioneer for an acceleration of the economic reforms, at present it is studying the role of politics in economic life. The main task will be to democratize the leadership structure in such a way that such a setback as took place in 1973 following administrative breaks will be prevented."

CSO: 3620/290

BRIEFS

GDR MINISTER VISITS--Rudi Georgi, GDR minister of machine tool and processing machinery building, arrived to Budapest on 31 January, at the invitation of Laszlo Kapolyi, minister of industry. [Excerpt] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 1 Feb 85 p 8 AU] Rudi Georgi, GDR minister of machine tool and processing industry machines, who paid a visit to Hungary at the invitation of Laszlo Kapolyi, minister of industry, left Budapest on 2 February. During his visit to Hungary, he held talks with his hosts on cooperation between the two countries in the machinery industry. They agreed that present cooperation between the Hungarian and GDR enterprises in machine tools, textile machines, printing press, and plastic material processing machine production, will also continue in the 1986-1990 period. They decided to expand cooperation in the development of robot-technology and the utilization of complete production systems. In the course of his visit to Budapest, Rudi Georgi paid a visit to the Institute of Research of the Machine Tool Plants. [Excerpt] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Feb 85 p 5 AU]

SERBIAN HUNGARIANS VISIT--A delegation of the Federation of Hungarians from Serbia paid a visit to Hungary from 29 January to 1 February at the invitation of the Ministry of Culture. The delegation provided information about the life and work of the Hungarian population in Serbia and about the educational and cultural activity of the Federation. On the occasion of their visit to Hungarian cultural institutions and organizations, they also held talks on how these institutions could contribute to the activity of the Federation, to the mother-tongue instruction of the Hungarian minority in Serbia, and to the fulfilment of their cultural needs. The delegation was received by Imre Pozsgai, general secretary of the National Council of the PPF, and Ferenc Ratkai, deputy minister of culture, chairman of the Hungarian side of the mixed Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural cooperation committee. [Text] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Feb 85 p 4 AU]

AFGHAN PATRIOTIC FRONT DELEGATION--The Afghan National Patriotic Front delegation paid a visit to Hungary at the invitation of the National Council of the PPF, from 28 January to 4 February. The delegation was led by Berek Safii, deputy chairman, member of the Revolutionary Council and of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The delegation held talks with Secretary General Imre Pozsgay. With the negotiating team of the PPF they discussed the possibilities and tasks of cooperation between the two patriotic fronts and set them down in an agreement. The delegation met

with Jenő Kovács, deputy head of department of the MSZMP Central Committee; Karoly Palotai, deputy chairman of the National Council of Trade Unions; and with Istvan Darvasi, secretary of the foreign affairs department of the National Assembly. In Győr-Sopron County the delegation studied the activity of the county committee of the PPF. The meetings held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere were also attended by Ambassador Jeelani Bakhtari, and the mutual solidarity and friendship between the Hungarian and Afghan people was repeatedly asserted. The delegation left Hungary on 4 February. [Text] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Feb 85 p 5 AU]

SRV DEPUTY PREMIER VISITS--György Lazar, chairman of the Council of Ministers, received on 5 February in his office Vo Bguen Giap, deputy chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers, who has been in Hungary on a working visit since 2 February. During his stay in Hungary, the SRV deputy premier held talks with Lajos Czinege, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Lenárd Pál, chairman of the National Technological Development Committee. Vo Nguen Giap is leaving Hungary today. [Text] [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Feb 85 p 1 AU]

CSO: 2500/250

WARSAW PRESS COMMENTS ON U.S.-USSR MIDDLE EAST TALKS

LD191847 Warsaw PAP in English 1711 GMT 19 Feb 85

[By PAP correspondent Franciszek Malinowski]

[Text] Vienna, 19 Feb--Two-day U.S.-Soviet talks on Middle East are due to open here today. According to both Moscow and Washington, they will serve exchanging opinions. No communique is expected after their conclusion and no details will be divulged to the press.

Observers here point out that it is the first direct dialogue between the two great powers concerning Middle East in several years. They also emphasize the expertise of the delegates of both sides who were previously posted as diplomats in various Middle Eastern states.

Commenting on the talks, SZTANDAR MLODYCH youth daily pointed out that "until now (?the U.S. Administration) has firmly rejected (the idea of) any meetings with Soviet representatives on this issue. So, if President Reagan has now made this small step, it is because he has probably finally come to realistically assess the situation in the Middle East."

This situation is such that "none of the two great powers alone, despite their might, can succeed in solving the immensely complex Middle Eastern problems."

Another reason for U.S. readiness to exchange views is the pressure of international public opinion, including some U.S. allies in Europe, the daily added.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily wrote that the meeting in Vienna testifies to a more realistic attitude of the U.S. Administration, but stressed that this realism had been forced upon the United States by developments.

"The United States has failed in attempts to impose on the Arab states its own formula of restoring peace to the Middle East, to establish a military monopoly in the region, and to dislodge the Soviet Union from its traditional positions (there)," the paper said.

Assessing the prospects before the meeting, SLOWO POWSZECHNE Catholic daily noted that "it is unlikely that concrete decisions will be made during the talks. Divergencies are too wide. But the talks will allow the sides to better understand their positions."

A more optimistic note was struck by SZTANDAR MLODYCH, which said that "perhaps the two sides will find some further possibilities of not only exchanging opinions, but also of cooperation."

CREATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL DEBATED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 52, 29 Dec 84 p 6

/Article by Stanislaw Podemski/

/Text/ Art 33 of the Polish Constitution begins with these words: "The Constitutional Tribunal rules on accordance with the Constitution of laws and other normative acts of the superior and central state authorities" and ends as follows: "The jurisdiction, structure and procedure of the Constitutional Tribunal are determined by statute." For the citizens of a country in which in the past many administrative enactments have infringed upon the laws (for example, the retroactive regulations), and where until now prewar regulations are still in force (for example, the law on associations), this is a constitutional promise full of practical sense and significance.

Where and quomodo lie the most important lines of the dispute on what should be the future statute of the Constitutional Tribunal? In fact, there are at least three of them.

In the first place, it must decide whether every act and every decree and regulation of the superior authorities can be examined by the tribunal to establish if they are or not in accordance with the Constitution. Opinions in this matter may differ greatly. One can insist that since the law should not be retroactive, only that which has come into existence after the law was passed (or at best after the change in the Constitution of March 1982, concerned with the tribunal) will be subject to judicial control.

Such a solution would be apparently logical, whereas in fact it would lead to vagaries and contradictions, undermining the very intent of the Constitution. In 1981 there was begun a longstanding and still-continuing process of essential changes in legislation. If one would exclude from the tribunal's jurisdiction everything that came into existence before it was called into being, then the majority of laws, decrees and executive regulations would be beyond its control. In such a case the tribunal would examine the newly introduced changes in the old laws, but not their original core. Such incoherence cannot be tolerated by any legal system!

Apprehensions are likewise being voiced that the Constitution might have carried things too far by subjecting to the tribunal's control all "normative acts of

the superior and central state organs" without exception. But those are regrets after the event, for without changing the Constitution the tribunal's jurisdiction cannot be bowdlerized.

After all, every court sometimes examines even the most confidential cases. It then holds a closed hearing, excluding the public, and that is the only way known in Polish legal procedure. The state does not hide any secrets, even the greatest ones, from its judges, and there is no reason to do so, especially in relation to judges elected by the Sejm itself "from among persons distinguished by their legal knowledge."

Who should have the right to bring complaints to the tribunal? Here too opinions differ considerably. The Council of State, the government, the Presidium of the Sejm--there is a general consensus on this. There are no serious opponents either of granting this right to the higher instance of PRON /the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth/, since in the past year it achieved a constitutional basis for its actions. It is worse with granting the tribunal itself the right to act ex-officio, on its own initiative, irrespective of receiving some complaint from the outside, and there is no consensus whatever that a body of citizens (and not an institution alone) could present its opinion as to the unconstitutionality of some law or the illegality of a regulation. Against this last possibility the opponents advance two arguments: there will be an outpouring of complaints from the litigious persons and groups ill-disposed toward the authorities, availing themselves of this as one more oppositional manifestation.

Of course, we cannot reject these misgivings, but any legal process can be abused, and after all it is not. Legal actions of the contentious constitute an insignificant percentage of legal cases, and such a gratifying occasion as the legal contestation of elections to people's councils was used only a dozen or so times, and then by people who in no way can be accused of any oppositional connections or initiatives (this was demonstrated by hearings in the Supreme Court).

Why it is so important not to obstruct access to the tribunal for uninstitutionalized social initiatives? The tribunal was conceived as an important link in the whole system of institutions to ensure the perception of warning signals in case of impending political crisis, which has always been preceded by the shutting up of the official institutionalized channels. Then the criticism manifested itself within the pale of informal groups and initiatives. The future law on the tribunal should draw conclusions from the quite recent past, and this is also encouraged by the resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress itself.

The way in which access to the Constitutional Tribunal will be outlined will also determine its later life. It can have an artificial, decorative, window-dressing life-history, but its life may also be rich, interesting, of great value for building and stabilizing the social system, the shape of the state the rule of law and order, and the protection of individual rights.

1015

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LUBLIN OFFICIAL DISCUSSES SOCIOPOLITICAL TRENDS, REFORMS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8, 12-13 Jan 85

[8 Jan 85 pp 3, 5]

[Interview with Prof (Dr) Wieslaw Skrzydlo, expert in constitutional law, first secretary of PZPR Provincial Committee in Lublin, by Jerzy Wierzycholski: "Prospects of Renewal (1); We Must Not be Impatient"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Jerzy Wierzycholski: Do you agree that we are entering into a period which is somewhat crucial in the implementation of socialist renewal? During the past 3 years legal foundations were built for changes in the economy and in the political system. The creation of material guarantees for renewal follows a state policy, directed to society, which is aimed at wide-scale agreement. These are facts which, to a large degree, are already accomplished. But now the important matter is the quality of the public reply to this offer. Unequivocal opinions are more difficult to obtain in this regard. Social moods are constantly changing. The people's hopes and anticipations on renewal are not, I believe, being reflected in a growth of social activeness. Yet only the people--their work, skills and involvement--can determine the form of renewal and the nature of the changes being made.

[Answer] Professor Skrzydlo: But this should be seen as a social process. A process of enormous and deep changes, comparable only with the 1940's. And thus it must endure. On the one hand the changes which have already been made must become structurally clear, and on the other hand they should find acceptance in public consciousness. Neither one nor the other will happen immediately. If we are to be reliable in what we are doing and base it solidly on public integrity then we cannot be impatient or resentful. We are creating renewal under very difficult political, social and economic conditions and this means that we must also consider the realities, as well as show a lot of courage and consistency in our actions. The past 3 years have clearly demonstrated that neither the party nor the state authorities lack persistence and determination in implementing the program of the Ninth Congress.

But I agree that we are now entering a crucial period. This is because, in my opinion, the center of gravity is already shifting from organizational and legislative action to political action among the broad social circles, action to

draw people to work concretely in the social self-government structure. In other words, we are entering a period in which renewal must more visibly leave the legal framework, descend from "the top" and reach the people on the bottom, where they work and where they live. The people must have a better feeling of what renewal is doing for them specifically, in the social and economic sense. How it affects the quality of life, the government-office and citizen relations, how it rewards integrity of work, etc. People tend to prove assumptions, the changes already made, with their everyday life. And this process will continue to grow.

Thus all of us, both state and the society, are beginning to pass a practical test in the implementation of the task which we have undertaken. But the party has a special responsibility here. After all, it is both the creator and the main force of the renewal program. The Ninth Congress program, despite the fact that it was begun during so difficult a period, and was so strongly attacked by Solidarity, reached the people and is now fulfilling many of their anticipations. And now, today, when we pause to consider the state of public awareness, the extent of civic activeness, the party members must also remember that not only the party but above all the people will hold us accountable for the implementation of the Ninth Congress program. Because this program was and is directed at all Poles and its execution is based on public participation.

[Question] But we hear that our society was not yet ready for such far-reaching changes, that it does not know how to make use of self-governing mechanisms, of economic reform. How do you see our present social condition, the degree of people's activeness?

[Answer] The easy answer is that society is not yet equal to something. This is very dangerous thinking because it implies that the authorities are wise but the people are immature. We all know to what this kind of reasoning has brought us. We are now paying a bitter price for this, both the authorities and the citizens. This kind of thinking must be totally rejected.

On the other hand, there is of course the question whether we are able to correctly use that which self-dependence, decentralization and economic reform brings us. Here the situation varies considerably. We have both positive and negative examples. It appears that the new mechanisms need more application in practice if their functioning is to produce measurable social results. And at the same time, the influence of people and their actions on the functioning of specific state and economic structures must be more clearly pronounced. Can we speak now, for example, about the differences in results obtained by an active, well-managed people's council and a weak, inept council? This is even more distinct when applied to economic enterprises. These differences should be more and more pronounced. After all, the new economic and social mechanisms are supposed to reward self-dependence, thrift, prudence and social initiative, while eliminating carelessness, neglect, waste, etc.

Today this is not very perceptible, hence many people are still distrustful and are wavering. The political enemy tries to instigate these attitudes. What we see today is colored, obviously, by the experience of the recent past.

The people believed in Gierek's policies and were disappointed. They trusted in Solidarity and were made fools of. After that they experienced the shock of martial law. Is it any wonder that many of them do not want to declare themselves yet, that they do not believe that we will help them, that we will "push ahead," when they do not see any clear results? For a long time the good faith of many people was put to too heavy a test and we are now simply reaping the results of this.

[Question] Will this go on for a long time?

[Answer] I do not think so. I believe this is a temporary situation which results from the nearness of the events which we have experienced. It is also the result of present economic and social factors. I am an optimist. I see that we are clearly breaking through to the people. Man by nature is born to be active, and many of us have a bent for community activity. Most of our society will not be content to stand on the sidelines for a long period of time. That is simply tiring. I believe that the awareness that inactivity cannot bring results is becoming stronger. And after all, the country's needs are enormous in every dimension. Everyone can see this. I am often among workers and I see this breakthrough in human awareness in favor of social action and activity.

Let me give you an example. Two and a half years ago when I assumed the first-secretary functions and would go down to the production floor to talk to the workforce I would be talking to one person and someone would be listening from a distance, but many of the workers would be so involved in their work that they did not even glance up. Now this has clearly changed. The people are talking openly about what they see that is good, and especially about what is bad, what irritates them and what is pushing us further back.

But this positive process is not perceived the same way in all surroundings. My observations have shown that in the large workplaces, among the large-industry working class, activeness is more apparent, and the vigor of public life is livelier. However, in the smaller surroundings there is more wavering, more waiting attitudes. Renewal is reaching those areas more slowly and is not very perceptible among the people.

But in general I notice that the social base for a correct and universal process of reform and renewal, a base for consolidating the state and emerging from the crisis, for implementing the party policy, is clearly growing. Nevertheless, along with more visible candidness on matters of the factory and the state, a more critical outlook is also growing.

[Question] Public criticism is rather specifically directed. People always have the same problem with government offices. The local picture, particularly of the authorities, has not changed very much. Reform is still not as effective as had been anticipated, the quality of products is poor, it is just as hard to be innovative as it was previously. The average person may ask: At what point are we? Are we perhaps dealing with a return to old bureaucratic habits and methods?

[Answer] I have to say that these are not isolated feelings. I often am asked the same questions. They were asked immediately prior to this interview at a meeting in the Interprovincial Party School. One of those in attendance said that in his enterprise the administration tripled in size. People are asking why we are trying to solve the problem of market supplies by increasing prices, and they say we are still doing too little in insisting on better organization of work, improving quality, and eliminating waste. The citizen is wondering whether we are doing everything wisely, or are there still too many things that are done randomly, without thorough consideration. Those are the matters that are frequently brought up and they do not improve the social climate. They make it harder for us to stimulate society, to increase its participation in shaping the process of renewal and surmounting the economic crisis.

Standing in the way are not only the still-persisting organizational shortcomings, but also the old habits of thinking and acting. Can we speak of a return to bureaucracy when, in my opinion, this phenomenon, which it took years to grow, was never fully eradicated? It appears that the mechanisms of reform are still not strong enough to bring about a definite reduction of the effect of bureaucracy in our economic and social life. But we should not allow bureaucratic structures to dominate over public and economic life. After all, bureaucracy destroys people's individuality, it kills self-dependence and takes away initiative. It also causes social callousness, failure to react to human affairs, and indifference to many unfavorable events.

I believe this is a very serious condition. Bureaucracy and callousness are the greatest enemies of renewal because they work against the people.

[Question] Is it possible that the system of safeguards established was not sufficiently effective? If so, what is the remedy for this?

[Answer] I would say it differently. All of the systems and economic changes which we have already made are indisputably going in the right direction. Without them all of the talk about combating negative aspects, including bureaucracy, would simply be claptrap. However, they are not yet strong enough to alone bring clear, perceptible social results. That is why I am placing so much emphasis on political influence on human attitudes and motivations.

And here I again return to the question of party responsibility for the way the processes of renewal are going. It is primarily the party which must operate by new methods, i.e., by discussions, by relevant arguments, by conviction in arriving at specific decisions or positions, and then by consistency and discipline in implementing them. The time for issuing orders has passed, and anyone who does not understand this exposes the party and the state--and let us say this very plainly--to another social conflict. In arguing, it is important that committee resolutions and orders from above not be used as shields to hide behind. That is not very convincing. The point is that the person be convinced in his own mind about the matter at hand. Only if he himself is convinced can he then convince others.

That is how I understand the methods of political influence. They are now and will continue to be indispensable. But they are also the most difficult. That is why the party needs not members as much as it needs real activists. And on this we are still not too strong. And not because the party lacks suitable, committed people. The majority of our members are these kind of people. But because the political methods are not popular enough yet to have been universally accepted, to achieve the results which would be satisfactory to us.

Thus, if we attach such importance to combating bureaucratic methods we must do so constantly and consistently within the party. Experience has taught us that often bad tendencies appeared first in the party and then spread to state and social activities. Now we understand this and therefore we believe that everything that is good, democratic, innovative, should first of all, but not just, stem from the party and that it should become permanently entrenched in the activities of the state structures and our entire public life. I refer to the active, public understanding of the party's leading role.

[Question] The processes about which we have talked thus far especially influence the functioning of the principle of democracy, the substance and scope of social understanding. We will try to develop this more broadly in the second part of the interview.

[12-13 Jan 85 pp 3, 5]

[Text] [Question] We devoted the first part of our interview (RZECZPOSPOLITA No 6] mainly to the political, economic and social conditions which characterize the present stage of implementation of the renewal program. Let us now look at this from the standpoint of the implementation of the principles of democracy, public participation in governing the state. Responsibility for the state today is not something abstract. By granting broad powers, by decentralizing authority, it has become the responsibility of the particular elements which make up the state structure. But we may get the impression that self-government, democracy and self-dependence, especially under local conditions, are ideas which are not very concrete.

[Answer] I agree. But here, too, we are just at the beginning of the road. For years we have told the people about the need to learn about democracy, except there was no school in which it could have been learned. Then people surfaced who wanted to transform democracy, independence, and self-dependence into weapons of struggle against the state. Now, as part of the renewal program, it has become possible for the democratic procedures and self-governing principles in the operation of state and public structures to strengthen the state and ensure the citizens' subjectivity.

And we should not lose this chance. This pertains to the entire strongly expanded self-governing sphere, and particularly to the people's councils as organs of local authority which unite the social infrastructure in a given area.

I see the enlargement of the role and authority of the councils primarily on two planes. First, expansion of the control function of the councils themselves and the various forms of genuine social control under their auspices. The people's councils, after all, are the foundation on which the principle of democracy is based. The people know best of all what troubles them the most. They know how to accurately point to signs of insensitivity, disregard for the law, and ineptness, by which the state and society both suffer the most. Professional control is often routine and directed at overall matters. It should be more strongly supported by social action. Initial experiences with the experimental actions taken by the Worker-Peasant Inspection, particularly in small communities, confirm this observation.

The second plane is more connection of the work of the councils with the functioning of the self-governing social organizations. During the next few years we should create a unified system of social representation. In the local areas everything should be concentrated around the activities of the people's councils. At present the social forces are widely dispersed. The way in which the councils are connected with the residents' self-governing organs, although defined by law, is still not adequate. The self-government elections which were held in the last few days should be the turning point which will make it possible to intensify the integration processes. They should also gradually encompass other types of self-government, and social, cooperative and union organizations. While maintaining their own identities and independence, they should develop other forms of cooperation with the councils, and assume those problems which are common for different communities and relate to the working and living conditions of all residents.

Starting from the bottom, from the gminas and the towns, where this process is most natural, we should, in effect, during the next few years, develop a comprehensive model of the structure of authority in the state. This model would link the activities of the representative bodies with the functioning of the social infrastructure. We have written the idea of self-government as a principle of the state's political system into the constitution. Therefore, it is important that we should establish a harmoniously functioning system which will strengthen and socialize the state, based on this principle.

[Question] This is, as I understand it, the prospect of deepening and expanding the partnership arrangement of social forces being formed now within the framework of renewal. This is an open arrangement which serves to articulate the interests and needs of the state as a whole, as well as the social and group needs and interests. This is also an arrangement which is much more complicated. General Jaruzelski presented the essence of it at the Seventeenth Plenum when he said that "the more difficult it is to govern, the better it is for our goals." What does it mean today to govern?

[Answer] Well, that is just the point. If we are dealing with a partner who cooperates in striving for a common goal but has his own opinion as to how specific matters are solved, or methods of operation, then we must have a discussion with him, to convince each other mutually as to what is best, what is realistic and what is not, what brings only immediate benefits and what serves long-range goals.

Today, under conditions of crisis, we face such problems almost daily and at every step. That is why a dialogue is indispensable. Today no one has a monopoly on wisdom. It must be gained jointly. Partnership in governing and in decisionmaking will strengthen all of its participants--the PZPR, the other political parties, and the self-government, trade union and social organizations. That is the basis of democratic forms of managing and governing. The entire structure of the state is thus consolidated. It is important that each side of this dialogue contribute as much of its own constructive thought into the work of renewal, into the solving of matters of the state, region and workplace.

The road before us is for the most part a road of coordination, consultation and negotiation, at various levels of state management. But it must also be, and to a larger degree than heretofore, a road of strict enforcement of jointly developed decisions, more self-dependence and performance discipline, and more specific responsibility for accomplishing an accepted task. Without this, self-government and self-dependence are merely words, or, what is worse, transform themselves into parochialism, with every group trying to protect its own interests at the expense of the whole. These are real dangers which are already evident and which reduce management efficiency and social influence on undertaking activity.

I am often in the factories and see what this partnership is like on a daily basis. I see how hard it is for the self-governments and trade unions to establish themselves under new conditions, how difficult it is for them to come to an understanding with management. I see how many jurisdictional disputes there are, and how many of them have to do with prestige. Conflicts of interest also appear more often. With time, the former will disappear, but we will have to learn to live with the latter. We can no longer operate so as not to offend anyone. In this partnership arrangement the party too must find its place.

At one time the party acted by speaking alone while others listened. Now we are dealing with partners who want to show their presence and are sometimes loud, but they too bear responsibility for their workplace, for matters concerning the workforce. And so they can no longer be ordered about. However, it is the job of the party to support each of the members of this arrangement within the scope of his jurisdiction and authority, and especially to see to it that its actions conform with overall-social interests.

[Question] Does this not reduce the party strictly to the role of arbitrator? Does it not infringe on its leadership role? Such doubts, and even beliefs, are not at all isolated.

[Answer] This is a total misconception. It is not a question of arbitration but about active leadership in the implementation of the party's policy on reform on a daily basis. And this must be done differently than it was in the past. There are party members in the trade unions, in the self-governments, in the social organizations, and in the representative bodies. They must first work out a joint course of action so as to later, by their own convictions, influence their colleagues and persuade them to the party line.

That is what gives it strength, even if it is in the minority, because frequently that is exactly what happens.

That is how I see the role of the party in the state. In any case, those are the methods which were always used in the party during the period when it was healthy, even when its activities were secret, or when the party was small. Today we want to implement the party's policy and fulfill its leading role through the full involvement of our members in the people's councils and in the entire social infrastructure. We should not act in place of these bodies but we can and should influence them politically with the force of arguments.

Not all party members are yet convinced of the need for a new style of thinking and acting in exercising authority, of the necessity for constant work in gaining, for the party, its social authority. I believe that we should be more rigorous and consistent in this regard. We should increase our requirements and discipline, especially among people in state and administrative positions. It is important that increasingly larger public support be created for the processes of renewal, for gaining more allies for the party line, for increasing our joint Polish responsibility for solving the matters of the state and its citizens.

[Question] We cannot talk about progress in renewal without consolidating and expanding social conciliation. It is often said now that it is a fact, but on the other hand there are many who say that this conciliation applies only to those who are convinced. Then how do we reach those who are not convinced? Because certainly we agree that this has to be done...

[Answer] I often hear this statement: There is PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) and within its framework we can achieve such a conciliation. I see in this a tendency to treat PRON as an instrument, as a "professional" organization concerned with conciliation. This is, in my opinion, too official a stance which does not approach the goal. After all, it is not a matter of our being able to talk to those who are already convinced, but it is a matter of our constant search for agreement with those who do not support us, who are still not convinced by our arguments. This is indispensable if we are to reach the people--the people who are patriotic but who hurt or are confused by the personal experiences which they endured not only in the last few years but often going back to the 1940's and 1950's.

Obviously we are not going to search for conciliation with the avowed class enemy who undermines the political foundations of our state. We will not talk with Bujak, Lis, Kuron and the like, but we should fight for many of those who are still under their influence, for those who are under the influence of the underground newspapers or western radio broadcasts. This is a long and arduous job which requires deep understanding of human problems but which brings results. And as progress is made in the renewal process and its positive aspects become established and its negative aspects overcome, the results will be increasingly greater.

During the past 3 years we have done a great deal in behalf of understanding. The consistent policy of the party and the state has already largely expanded the numbers of the convinced. We have more and more specific arguments although, which under crisis conditions is unavoidable, there are a good number of negative aspects. But it is not a case of how many people we have persuaded but how many are still to be persuaded. And where people's convictions are concerned, their motivations, one must be very careful in drawing conclusions.

The June elections to the councils clearly showed that the majority of our society wants tranquility, stability, and normal living conditions. But neither should we simplify things by saying that everyone who went to the voting booth was "for," just as we should not generalize by saying that all those who did not vote are against socialism, against the party, against renewal. I believe there is a considerable number of people for whom we can and should fight, to persuade them to a policy of conciliation and reform.

Therefore, I believe that it is essential that we steadily expand the PRON platform and approach new groups of people all the time. There must also be a community, really a personal, influence exerted by those who support renewal--both party members and not, believers and nonbelievers, those genuinely committed to change--on those who are not convinced, in their immediate surroundings, their workplace and place of residence.

I always understood conciliation or understanding to be something of a genuine mass conversation, a discussion with those who want to talk with us. As an offer which must be untiringly renewed in the name of our common Polish interest, an interest which is inseparably connected with the interest of our socialist state.

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WOZNIAK DISCUSSES WARSAW'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC REALITIES

Warsaw ARGUMENTY in Polish No 3, 20 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Interview with Marian Wozniak, member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee and secretary of the Warsaw Party Committee, by Zenon Skuza; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The 40th anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw is approaching. It is a fitting occasion to present a picture of our capital. I would not, however, want to concentrate attention on the past. If you agree with my point of view, I would like to discuss the present and the future of our city, its people and its problems and aims, looking at all these things without rose-colored glasses...

[Answer] Not only do I accept that point of view, but it suits me very well.

[Question] Good. Let us proceed. Please say a few words describing the political-social situation in the capital and the tasks facing the Warsaw party organization, state authorities and the city administration resulting from this situation.

[Answer] The situation in Warsaw, as in the rest of the country, is difficult and complex, but for a certain time now we have been noticing real positive changes. In most of the centers, particularly in the workers center, realistic evaluations and rational political behavior are beginning to dominate. Symptoms of these changes and expressed concern for the future, growth in production and its quality are encouraging and generate optimism. The majority of the Warsaw community, it is true, favors not becoming involved in political matters, but is also behaving with reserve with respect to appeals and calls to various forms of protest or political manifestations by anti-social forces. It is critical of activities and actions of the authorities, but even more critical of the political adventurism proposed by antisocial centers.

It is encouraging that in most of the workers centers, peace, order, stability, and the need for understanding and dialogue are recognized as the greatest values. We see a systematic shrinking of both the base and influence of counterrevolutionary forces, and speaking of these questions, we must not forget that their strongest centers were precisely in Warsaw, that they and their activities enjoyed the support of many influential representatives

of various creative centers, that the leaders grouped in them continue to try to sow ferment, confound and incite to rebellion at every occasion or to create suitable pretexts to serve this end. This state of affairs places great obligations on the Warsaw organization. Calling this to mind, we remember that resolving these problems must be done differently than in the past, that regaining trust is most important for the party; defending the basic principles, it must know how to attract sympathizers in the broadest social masses in order to realize its program, a program of understanding, struggle and reform.

Looking for the most suitable forms and methods of functioning, we are trying to take advantage of all the best experience of our native revolutionary tradition and of the experience of brother parties, especially the Moscow party organization, with which the Warsaw organization has many ties and contacts.

[Question] What favors normalization of life and which factors and conditions make this process more difficult or inhibit it?

[Answer] In my opinion, primarily two reasons are decisive as to the rate of positive transformation of the situation and of living conditions both in the capital and in the rest of the country: to what degree the party succeeds in recapturing the trust of the people and becoming the directing and leading force in the life of the people and the state and a whole complex of matters: wages--market--prices.

[Question] Excuse me for interrupting, but despite your statement, almost universally I have heard it said in various parts of the country that Warsaw is a privileged city, that the residents of Warsaw live better, more comfortably, in better circumstances, that is, that the average wage is highest in Warsaw, that the Warsaw market is the best supplied, that the period of waiting for cooperative housing is the shortest, that here we have the greatest number of attractive places and work places, a network of nursery schools, preschools, and schools, not to mention their quality... What is the situation in fact?

[Answer] Let us begin with earnings. With a higher work efficiency than that of the rest of the country, the average wage in Warsaw is lower than the average for the country. In comparison, the average wage in socialized enterprises on a nationwide scale in 1984 was 17,587, and in a similar period, the average wage in Warsaw was 17,129, while the cost of living in Warsaw is, without a doubt, among the highest in the country.

[Question] And market supply?

[Answer] It certainly is not among the best. The principle of proportional distribution of goods is unfavorable to the residents of Warsaw. Speaking of this problem, we must not forget, for example, that the number of customers in Warsaw is higher every day than the number of those living in the Warsaw metropolitan area. Many customers during working hours are visitors... We

are making an effort to regulate this in a different way as long as there are shortages in the market place.

[Question] It is difficult not to agree with you. In the most difficult months of 1981, the crisis was most obvious in Warsaw. In no large or average-size city in Poland were the shop shelves emptied as effectively.

[Answer] I noticed the same thing and have made similar observations.

[Question] And the waiting period for cooperative housing?

[Answer] It is longer than in other cities in Poland. From the time a complete deposit is made, the average waiting period for cooperative housing in Wroclaw, Poznan, Gdansk, and Katowice is about 12 years; in Warsaw, it is 15 years, and with the present rate of building, it may be even longer.

[Question] And the network of nursery schools, preschools and schools?

[Answer] It is very inadequate with respect to needs. For several years now we have had to transport children from new settlements to village schools because existing facilities are not able to accept them even when they work two or even three shifts. The infrastructure was neglected for years. We are now experiencing the consequences of this state of affairs.

[Question] How do the capital authorities intend to resolve this problem and when?

[Answer] According to the plan of the State Presidium, 70 preschools and 50 schools will be added by 1990. This does not mean that the needs will be completely satisfied in this period. The final implementation of this plan will decidedly improve the situation in this area.

[Question] The picture you present, Comrade Secretary, may cure more than one person of illusions as to the glamour of life in the capital...

[Answer] It was not and is not my intention to either attract people to the capital or discourage them from coming. I only stated the actual case. This is what it is.

[Question] And as far as the workplaces are concerned?

[Answer] Actually more than 50,000 jobs are waiting for workers; of these, 45,000 are laborer positions.

[Question] The fact cannot be hidden, however, that in no other Polish city are there so many cultural institutions or so many titles of newspapers and periodicals, institutes, laboratories, and publishing houses...

[Answer] That is true, but ask which of these today have job openings, what their pay scales are, what the qualifications are for working there... How

often young people look at the capital as the promised land...

[Question] What then is actual and possible, and what must we not expect in the near future?

[Answer] Not to be expected is a quick improvement in living conditions: increase in number of housing units, a great flow of money, abundance of goods in the market place. This will be a long-term process. Desirable and possible for certain is increasing the degree of activity of plants, the quality of work, organizing work in each plant and at each work place, better use of simple and complex reserves, increase in the degree of responsibility of each and every one for the work done, and activation of the great intellectual potential that Warsaw and the country command.

[Question] Since you raised the question of the intellectual potential, perhaps it is time to ask: is the potential that the capital commands adequately exploited in resolving the basic problems of the national economy?

[Answer] This question is extraordinarily complicated. Warsaw industry accounts for more than eight percent of national production. Its productivity is more 28 percent higher than the national productivity with wages lower in the order of 1000 zlotys per month. For more than a year, we have observed a tendency toward increase in production. But at this time, this positive phenomenon is not accompanied by an improvement in quality. Also, the dynamics of wage increases have slowed as has the flow of overissued money. This does not mean that the economic crisis of 1980-82 has been overcome. Many plants have not reached the production levels of 1979. Organization of work continues to be deficient, we continue to have to deal with manifestations of organizational structures inadequate to the demands of the economic reform. We are continually harassed by fluctuations in the work force, which involve as many as 20 percent of those working in Warsaw plants, the best experts are attracted by nonsocialized plants that offer better pay... that is one side of the coin; the other? What about this potential?... We are giving much attention to this problem. This is the key to increasing the rate at which the crisis is overcome and the national economy developed. These problems are at the very center of interest of the Warsaw party organization. We are greatly concerned about them. In placing before the Warsaw scientific community two basic problems: improving productivity and organization of work, we are convinced that these tasks will be undertaken and executed successfully. Together we are seeking the optimum resolutions as to how science can and should participate in resolving the basic social and economic problems in improving the mechanisms of functioning of the socialist state. We are conscious of the complexity of this problem, we know also what kind of conditions must be met and met systematically so that plans and goals might be realistic and might become reality. As a region, we will not be able to resolve many problems. Indispensable in this area are the decisions of the state. The Warsaw committee came forward with the suggestion that such areas as electronics, electrotechnology and electromechanics, which today are decisive and in the future will continue to be decisive in production being up to date, be included in the central plan so

that in conjunction with this, funds would also be available for their development. We are at a place where talking about progress and development will lead to neither progress nor development. We are trying also, more assiduously than before, to connect our development programs with the development programs of other socialist countries in this area. As a party organization, we will create favorable conditions and systematic solutions so that this program might be realized. We do not live and do not want to live by illusions. We know that headlong acceleration will not be achieved from one day to the next. This is impossible; but neither do we hide from the workers that "the most difficult is still before us," in the words of General Jaruzelski. We also know that the more universal the acceptance of our principles and plans, the more concrete will those goals and tasks be. We are imbued with optimism that the greater majority of the working class and of the scientific-technical community has a deep conviction that the quality and productivity of our work, how and when we overcome the crisis and its extensive consequences, depends on us alone.

Setting these tasks, we know also that we must effectively overcome our weaknesses. Particularly, to learn regional planning, and balance the economy of a region from the aspect of production capability, the material base and the work force as well, we must work out a complementary system of production, develop an honest knowledge about which factors might inhibit economic development of our region, how to develop the means for development of enterprises and how to convert the structure of plants to favor export; we must also carry out a restructuring of industry and make changes in management.

[Question] Does the line of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress implemented by the Warsaw organization find wide acceptance in the scientific centers?

[Answer] Again, this question is among the so-called difficult questions...

[Question] I believe that one cannot avoid those questions if one wants to talk about the actual situation of the party in general and the Warsaw party organization in particular...

[Answer] This is true, and for this reason I will not avoid answering the question. As in other cases, our position is not the result of the practice of "fortune-telling from tea leaves." We are supported by investigations, probes, discussions and the results of consultations not only with the party action groups. Without this information, we would not be able to formulate a proper diagnosis of the situation, let alone prognosticate or make actual decisions...

[Question] I believe that in what you have said a minute ago there is the essence of the process that General Jaruzelski described in the words, "The party is the same, yet it is not the same"...

[Answer] Scientific-research centers in the capital province command approximately 40 percent of our scientific potential. More than 33,000 workers

are employed in ministry scientific-research facilities. They are working in 88 central scientific-research institutes or their affiliates, 55 research-development centers and 16 other research units. This is an enormous potential.

This is also a great concentration of people, characters; it is a sum of attitudes, plans, goals, expectations. As you know, it was different in the past. Not always was the work of this high class of specialists properly evaluated and treated. Not always was sufficient attention given to the effects of their work. Even customs are evidence of this. Many of these people worked in a vacuum. Many had cause for frustration, discouragement; when we entered the crisis period, many took on a new form, moving to positions strange to us, some continue to be in a so-called "exile of the spirit." But it is also true that when restrictions were imposed on our country, the greater majority went to work, came to our aid with new ways of doing things. Even if it is true that the number of these new ways significant for development has decreased, those emergency suggestions had a real significance for the economy.

Speaking of this, we must not forget that the formation of this kind of attitude was influenced to no small degree by the reform, and primarily the undesirable effects of the economic reform. It did not create adequately strong motivation impelling enterprises to new, more promising methods. A certain effect was due also to the factor of compensation not being commensurate with qualifications since it was lower than the national average.

[Question] I do not think that these were all consequences of this state of affairs...

[Answer] Exactly. The low level of wages and income is especially strongly felt by young scientific workers. It discourages people capable of doing the work in these institutes and is the reason why people leave with "golden hands" to work in the nonsocialized sectors of the economy.

[Question] But to say "bad," or "good," does not explain very much...

[Answer] That is true, and for this reason the Warsaw organization, thinking of the future, is trying to find a solution to this dilemma, not only for the short term, but for the future, in order...

[Question] The system itself and the systemic resolution replaced improvisation in both actions and decisions that were of an emergency nature...

[Answer] Yes. We are concerned with a systemic resolution of this problem.

[Question] I believe that a real component of this sociopolitical situation that is poisoning the atmosphere of life at least in Warsaw is the community of the academicians, therefore, what the attitude of this community toward the party is, what its policies are in general, and its scientific and cultural policies in particular, how it perceives its obligations and tasks.

[Answer] The situation in this sphere is complicated. Today it does not look very optimistic. We must do much hard, deliberate, calm work if the auditoriums of higher institutions of learning, lecture halls, laboratories and the work going on in them are to carry out their primary roles and functions so that the atmosphere of life in this milieu might no longer be an atmosphere of a meeting where emotions evict not only reason and scientific arguments, but also common sense, in which reasons and needs of the socialist state will be the most important reasons, in which the role and function of the scientist, the student, the whole community will emanate from and serve the principles of the scientific policy of the state.

Even today attempts are still being made to make of the higher institutions of learning a ground from which antisocialist forces try to mount confrontations against the state authorities. Even today many opposition leaders, deluded in their hopes, want to turn the heads of the young people, incite them to spectacular actions, inducing disorder and unrest, destabilizing a situation that is returning to normal.

Attempts are still being made to abuse the law on higher schooling in the name of reasons contradictory to the purposes and interests of the socialist state, socialist democracy, and the goals of the education and rearing process.

The Warsaw committee, after penetrating analyses of this fact, has taken a stand to consider the problem in close cooperation with the scientific community: to what extent has this law passed its test, what should be changed.

[Question] Does this mean that the Warsaw committee does not want to limit itself to solutions of an organizational nature?

[Answer] Resolutions of that type, we believe, are the least desirable. We want the existing conflicts and inflammatory states to be resolved by way of dialogue. But speaking in favor of dialogue, we stress that the principles and institutional goals cannot be and will not be a subject of bartering. They are not subject and will not be subject to discussion. If anyone entertained such delusions, it is time to be rid of them. Higher institutions of learning cannot be and will not be a staging ground for battle aimed against the socialist state, the authorities or the party.

[Question] How and with what success are the principles of the cultural policy of the party embodied in life as far as the creative centers are concerned, how is cooperation between political and administrative authorities of the capital and creative artists shaping up?

[Answer] I will not deny that the conditions of activities of the party in Warsaw creative centers have been exceptionally difficult and complicated in recent years. The basic purpose of activities and manipulations on the part of many leaders was to paralyze party influence in precisely these centers by forming informal groups that were to carry out the functions of the state

apparatus, discredit the party and its policy. These attempts, as we know, were a flash in the pan, although in this period we did note painful losses. The Warsaw committee undertook widespread activity and educational-informational work in these centers, trying to rebuild, first of all, the organizations functioning there, to revitalize and activate them. I would like to stress that much attention has been given and will continue to be given to these matters.

[Question] And specifically, what initiatives did the capital party echelon take with respect to the creative centers?

[Answer] We introduced the idea of concentrating the largest number of creative people who belong to the party around the City Section Committee and the Executive Committee and to have these units develop programs of action for their own centers. These programs appeared as a result of broad consultation with all basic party organizations. They were accepted by the administration of the executive committee. On the initiative of the executive committee, individual discussions took place with artists of all centers. These discussions were exceptionally informative and necessary. During these discussions, we explained a great deal to each other. But while analyzing the present state and looking for the causes of the development of the situation in the past, we emphasized the future. For us, this aspect was and will remain the most important. It was treated in the same way with the artists. Accepting this principle, we are looking for such methods and instruments as will help stimulate the developmental processes in culture and give preference to values emanating from the essence of socialist humanism; we are also trying to participate in finding the answer as to what type of relationship there can be between the artist and his audience and what kind is most desirable and proper, which values are most universally accepted by those who are the salt of this earth. Seeing things from this perspective, we recognized that in the sphere of cooperation with creative centers, the most important tasks for tomorrow and after tomorrow continue to be reinforcement of the role and authority of the basic party organizations and increasing their influence on the activity of the cultural institutions and the centers in which they function. We maintain an open attitude, respecting the indispensable right of the artist to autonomy of the creative process.

We cannot, however, reconcile ourselves to the activity of those artists who conduct open antistate activity, taking advantage of the institution of the Church as a convenient screen masking their actual goals, transforming temples into a theater where spectacles that have an obvious antisocialist message are presented. I do not believe that this form of extending the function of the Church expresses the essence of its pastoral activity, promotes the spirit of understanding and dialogue or emanates from the substance of the declaration signed by the party, political parties and secular Catholics. I also do not believe that battles about the cross in schools, initiated by provincial pastors, serve this idea nor does the content of many sermons emanate from a spirit of tolerance and respect for the constitutional separation of the state and the Church and the secular character of the state and state institutions.

[Question] Very briefly, please describe the content and character of the activity of the capital party organization with respect to the younger generations.

[Answer] This problem is one of the more important aspects of party work. Work with youth is an "investment" in our own future. We concentrate attention on the following matters: we are overcoming the passivity of youth, rebuilding confidence of youth in the party, the authority of the people, unleashing the activity of youth. We believe in putting their criticisms and innovative capacities to good use as an effective force for overcoming the crisis. We are trying to create the most favorable conditions for starting the young people in life, and are avoiding promises of spectacular gifts that are without foundation. We are glad when we find in the attitudes of the young a desire to find their own roles in the life of the community, when the individual and his affairs will not be lost from sight, when the young also demand their right to individual dreams and aspirations.

[Question] Is this program of ideological work with youth also accompanied by activities of an organizational type?

[Answer] These not only accompany the program, but are equally important. The list of these is long, and to avoid prolonging the interview, I will only say that their purpose is the creation of conditions for a true self-realization of the young people.

[Question] Is it possible to speak today of the correctness and efficacy of activities undertaken with youth by the Warsaw party organization?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, it is. We note a greater number of applications for party membership by young people than a year ago, a revitalization of the activity of youth organizations, their organizational consolidation, increase in young people's trust in the party and its policies...

[Question] But, by chance, is not this greater number of applications a result of the normalization of life?

[Answer] It is primarily the consequence of an increase of trust in the party and the candidates' desire to participate in the implementation of its program, which they recognize as their own, and which often does not have a sensible alternative.

[Question] In what do you see the greatest threat to this program, which -- there is no reason to hide this -- is a program oriented toward the future, a future time...

[Answer] First of all, in the fact of the desolation in the consciousness of young people, which occurred in the agitated years; in their apathy toward all activization programs; in the practice of separating the affairs of youth from the socioeconomic and political situation of the country; in the activity of antisocialist forces that attempt to gain the hearts and minds of the

young for their own goals that are contrary to socialism, socialist ideology, and in the automatic method that the affairs of youth are perceived by the party activists...

[Question] Mr Secretary, from what you have said thus far, how does it follow that the party work of the Warsaw organization and the party echelons is aimed toward the future, that the future, regardless of whether it is called so or not, is an ever repeated leitmotif.

[Answer] It would be very bad, if we, remembering the past and contending with the present, were to lose perspective. We would be parting with the best traditions of the revolutionary movement, with its Leninist vision...

[Question] If this is so, I would like you to say a few words as to what you actually intend to do for the future of the capital, its residents...

[Answer] Perhaps then, if you will agree to a telegram-like brevity, I will present those aims.

[Question] Please do.

[Answer] We have made development plans up to the year 2000.

In them we emphasize the following points: ensuring technical conditions for the functioning of the city (water, heat, sewage purification, utilization of waste), housing construction, development of the economy and services, development of material production along the lines of intensive management (technical progress, quality, reorganization of work), an efficient transport system (dedication of the first metro line built in cooperation with the Soviet Union), development of the infrastructure, especially hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, nursery schools, schools, preschools, libraries, houses of culture, etc.

[Question] This is an ambitious plan; how do you intend to implement it?

[Answer] We must make better use of our own potential. To pay attention to rational and harmonious development of the agglomerate, to exploit more judiciously the power and funds we have, and these are not small, we will have to be more effective and persistent in our activity; we are asking for involvement on the part of the residents of the capital. I also believe that we will be successful in overcoming carelessness through a concern for the quality of work and respect for public property. In celebrating the 50th [sic] anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw, we would like to be able to say that we did not waste time, that we did not lose our chance.

[Question] Are you not afraid that this program for development of the capital may become a Moloch...

[Answer] We may admit that the possibility exists theoretically. I do not believe, however, that this theoretical possibility will become a reality.

This process will not have a spontaneous character, and beyond that, we already have the principal city-building factors, great industrialization. Therefore, we are not threatened by a great invasion of new comers. From studies and observations, it follows that Warsaw, and especially its industry, will develop along the lines of structural reorganization, specialization and modern organization of work. We will also exploit the experience of other countries in resolving this problem so as not to repeat mistakes that we can avoid. It is our intention that the capital of the Polish People's Republic be a city in which the joy of life is not disturbed by difficulties known and typical for large agglomerations, a city in which all services work efficiently, including the administration, in which the market functions efficiently and well, which has a broadly developed infrastructure.

[Interviewer] I wish you success in implementing this program and thank you for this conversation.

2950

CSO: 2600/517

LEGAL INTRICACIES OF PROPOSED ELECTORAL LAW CLARIFIED

Warsaw ODRÓDZENIE in Polish No 3, 20 Jan 85 p 4

/Article by Maciej Urbaniak: "New Premises"/

/Text/ The "Premises for the Draft of the Law on Elections to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," which were prepared by the State Council, were published a few days ago. This document contains a number of new points in relation to the legal status in effect until now. It is based on the experiences that came out of the electoral campaign for the people's councils, and many of the proposed solutions are similar to those adopted in the electoral law for the people's councils.

Reading the propositions demands juridical exertion, especially from individuals who do not have a legal education. That is why the goal of the following comments is to simplify the reading of the document, paraphrase the terminology adopted in it and suggest recommendations for new solutions.

General Principles

The propositions do not change the principles of the electoral law in an essential way. Just as until now, elections are to take place based on the following principles:

Universality: the voters are all citizens who have reached a certain age, with the exception of those persons excluded by law, having been deprived of their legal rights by a legally valid decision of the court and divested by the court of their public rights; a consequence of the law on the State Tribunal is loss of the right to vote by individuals whose voting rights were taken away by a decision of the State Tribunal.

Equality: voters are entitled to only one vote for each voting list in the election.

Directness: voters choose deputies directly and can vote only in person.

Secret ballot: there must be a curtained area at each polling place which every voter has the right to use.

The premises do not repeat the regulation passed in the current law which gives the right to vote to individuals whose Polish citizenship has not been confirmed but who have been living on the territory of PRL for at least 5 years and are not citizens of another country (the so-called people without a country).

The lowering of the age limit for the passive electoral right (the right to be elected as deputy) from 21 to 18 is offered for public discussion as a variant solution. Adopting this proposal would require an amendment to the Constitution.

The State Council should arrange for elections to the Sejm, as they have up to now, no later than 1 month before a term is over. The resolution should be published in the DZIENNIK USTAW PRL at least 90 days before the election date set out in it (it has been 60 days until now). Lengthening the so-called election calendar will allow for a longer public discussion over the candidates. In the course of consultations over the "Premises," two variants were proposed for the elections: that the election day be designated as a legal day off work, or to have 2 consecutive days, one of which must be a day off.

Current regulations provide for elections not only on the territory of the PRL (together with ships at sea), but also beyond its borders (e.g., in diplomatic and consular posts or in larger concentrations of Polish citizens working in other countries). The "Premises" propose either that this solution remain or that elections be held exclusively on the territory of the PRL.

The next of the proposed variant solutions concerns the opening date of the newly elected Sejm term of office. In accordance with variant I, it will be reckoned from the day of elections, and in the case of variant II, from the day the first session convenes. At this point it is worth recalling that in the new voting law for the people's councils, the term of office of the councils at all levels is calculated from the day of their election.

The "Premises" designate the number of deputies at 460 (as it has been up to now) or 500 in variant II (this solution would require an amendment to the Constitution). These deputies are to be chosen in electoral districts and regions according to district and regional voting lists.

The idea of regional elections and regional lists is a totally new one in the Sejm electoral law. It is similar to the idea which was tested at the time of elections to provincial people's councils of the so-called provincial lists, which contained the names of councilmen chosen from the territory of the whole province by all the voters. It constitutes the legal reflection of the electoral practice in use up to now, which is based on placing activists who are not from the territory of the given electoral district but who were recommended by the central administration of the party and other political parties and social organizations at the top of lists of district candidates for representative. This practice, which is indispensable and applied in all countries, allows individuals to be brought into parliament who are connected as a rule with the capital but who are members of the administrative bodies of political parties. During the Second Republic in Poland it functioned in the form of

central lists (so-called state lists) submitted by the largest parties, out of which an appropriate number of candidates entered the Sejm automatically, in proportion to the number of votes attained by the given party.

Voting districts are to encompass a province or part of a province, while voting regions encompass all the districts over an area of one or several provinces.

It is proposed that the ratio of seats in the Sejm between the district lists and the regional ones come out to 85 percent to 15 percent or 80 percent to 20 percent, respectively. The electoral law for the people's councils defines the ratio of seats between the district and provincial lists as 85 percent to 15 percent.

The amount, the boundaries and the numbers of the voting districts and regions and also the number of deputies chosen in individual districts and regions will be defined by the State Council.

Electoral Board

The "Premises" do not foresee any new solutions insofar as types of election boards and the tasks of boards at particular levels are concerned. The only new thing is the idea, proposed as one option, of divesting a member of an election board of his seat from the moment he is placed on a list of candidates for deputy submitted for registration in any district. Until now a candidate for deputy could not be a member of any electoral board for the district in which he is a candidate. This regulation did not, however, concern the State Electoral Board.

In the regulations existing until now, the list of candidates was established by the appropriate committees of the National Unity Front. A different solution is currently being proposed. A Nationwide Electoral Convention and provincial electoral conventions are to be created to establish and submit lists. They will be made up of representatives at the appropriate level of the leadership of organizations who are signatories of the 20 July 1982 declaration concerning the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth /PRON/ (two-thirds of the convention members) and representatives from the leadership or agreements of trade unions, social-professional organizations of farmers, veterans' organizations, socialist youth organizations, and women's organizations (one-third of the convention members). The conventions would begin their activity from the moment they submit their constitution to the State Council. The "Premises" do not specify, however, the deadline by which they should be set up. It seems that such a regulation should be found in the electoral law.

The tasks of the electoral conventions are to include a paper based on the proposals of authorized organizations, preliminary lists of candidates for representative with which the Nationwide Electoral Convention would fulfill its work on all regionallists, their recommendation to the voters, examining the remarks and opinions of the voters which would be submitted in the course of presenting the candidates, and the final establishment of the lists and their submission to the appropriate electoral board.

This idea is similar to the institution of electoral bodies which were adopted in the electoral law for the people's councils. They did not, however, have the legal authority to examine the remarks of voters concerning the candidates, although they were obliged to comply in the case that a motion was passed at a pre-election meeting to remove a candidate from a list. The difference is in the size of the area of voting districts and regions, and in relation to this, in the lack of opportunity for all interested voters to express their opinions as to a possible motion to remove a candidate from a list. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of adopting such a motion at one or many meetings and, together with the appropriate statement of grounds, sending it to the convention, which will have to take it into account.

Candidates For Representative

According to the "Premises," these can only be citizens who give a pledge duly to execute the mandate entrusted to them for the good of society, in accordance with the principles of Poland's socialist system.

The names of individuals submitted by the central leadership of the organizations who are signatories of the PRON declaration and the executive committee of the PRON National Council will be placed on the regional lists. The district lists, on the other hand, will have the names of individuals submitted by the provincial leadership of these organizations, and also by the provincial authorities or the provincial agreements of PRON, trade unions, social-professional farmers' organizations, veterans' organizations, socialist youth organizations, women's organizations and other mass social organizations.

The proposed candidates will be recommended to the voters at meetings organized by PRON with the cooperation of electoral conventions and the organizations that put them up for vote. Their profiles will also be widely featured in the press, radio and television.

It is proposed in the "Premises" that the method of placing candidates on lists be similar to that for elections to people's councils. On regional lists the number of candidates would be greater than the number of parliamentary seats, depending on the variant adopted in the course of discussions, but not greater than half as many again or not greater than twice as many. The names of the candidates on all the lists would be placed in the order, established by the electoral conventions, in which they could receive seats in the Sejm.

The regulations concerning voting districts and voter lists are to be similar to the present ones. General regulations connected with the act of voting are defined in the "Premises" as well, in a method close to the present one in force. This document, however, foresees essential differences in specific solutions.

The first difference is the eventual shortening of hours during which polling places will be open in the event that the option of holding the elections over the course of 2 days is adopted.

The second difference concerns voting on district lists. The proposed regulations, as in the electoral law for people's councils, would make it possible for the voter to vote for one of two candidates making a claim to a parliamentary seat. Crossing off one of the names would result in an automatic declaration for the second candidate. Leaving neither name crossed off would give the vote to the individual placed first on the list.

It is proposed that in the voting for the regional list the principles so far in force in district voting be retained. Leaving a greater number of uncanceled names on the voting card than the number of seats available means giving the vote to all the "uncanceled" candidates who will be first in order on the list until the number of available seats is filled.

Establishing the Results of Voting and Elections

Votes cast on cards other than those officially settled on, and even on these cards but without an authentic seal, are to be regarded as invalid. A new solution compared to present regulations, one which echoes the electoral law for people's councils, regards as invalid those votes which are submitted on cards torn into two or more pieces.

The individual on the district list who received the most valid votes within the limits of the Sejm seats for which he is a candidate will be considered the winner.

The individuals who receive the next greater number of valid votes until the number of seats is filled will be the winners from the regional lists.

In both cases a 50 percent electoral turnout is proposed as a compulsory requirement. In the event that two candidates receive an equal number of votes, the order in which the person's name appears on the voting list will decide the order of obtaining a seat in both cases as well.

Repeated Elections

According to the "Premises" they ought to be held in districts where half of those with voting rights did not take part in elections. They are to be held by the same conventions and electoral boards and on the basis of the same voters' lists. The required 50 percent participation will not be necessary in this case to achieve appointment.

The Importance of Elections

The proposals in this area are different from the present regulations as well as from those adopted in the electoral law for people's councils.

Until now the reason for disqualifying elections could only be the ascertainment that a transgression against the election existed or that the regulations of the voting law were violated, insofar as the transgression or violation could have an effect on the outcome of the election. The Sejm made the decision in this matter. And the State Council, empowered by it, arranged for new elections or for a repetition of certain electoral activities.

The new electoral law for the people's councils gives all voters the right to "protest" the council election. The final vote in the matter of compliance with or rejection of the protest belongs to the Supreme Court.

The "Premises" foresee that a cause for protest may be a crime against the election or the violation of regulations in the law about voting and establishing election results. Every voter or (in the case of accepting variant II in the law) every voter with the right to vote in the district his protest concerns is to have the right to submit a protest.

The deadline for submitting a protest in writing to the State Electoral Commission is to be 7 days from the time the election results are submitted for public information. It should be submitted together with a statement of grounds indicating on what the voters is basing his accusations.

In the event that a resolution to invalidate the elections in a district or voting region is adopted, the Sejm charges the State Council with orders for a new election.

Termination of a Mandate in the Sejm

The new proposals are concerned here with the recall of a deputy by voters if by his acts he violates the post of deputy or shirks his duties in the Sejm, or in any other way betrays the trust of the voters. Until now such a motion could be brought forth only by an appropriate National Unity Front committee. It is proposed that this right be given to the organization that put the given individual up for candidacy, to the PRON National Council, or to the voters themselves (if the motion is supported by at least 10 percent of the voters of a given district or voting region). The Sejm, by a two-thirds majority vote, will be able to pass a resolution to turn to the voters for a recall of the deputy or to discontinue the proceedings. The decision to recall a deputy is to be decided by a majority vote of the electorate in voting to be held on the territory of the district or voting region.

12635

CSO: 2600/568

PZPR DAILY VIEWS 15TH PCF CONGRESS

AU191531 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Feb 85 p 6

[Article by Wlodzimierz Zralek: "The French Communists After the Great Debate"]

[Excerpts] The great hall of the Saint Quen sports center near Paris has been the site of the PCF Congresses for the past 9 years. Each of these congresses has made important decisions for the PCF and for the development of French political life.

The 15th Congress, which was held on 6-10 February, was of special importance and circumstances. During the press conference immediately after the congress, G. Marchais, who had been reelected general secretary of the party, said:

"We are experiencing a difficult period of time. In the past 20 years the communists have fought for the victory of the policy of the leftwing union in the conviction that this policy would help solve all serious problems. Today we know that this policy has failed, and the communists cannot help being disappointed, because they fought for this policy. What is more, the influence of our party has diminished. How is it possible for the communists not to be moved and even shocked in some cases? It would be disturbing if we were not moved."

Trying to find out why the leftwing union has failed to fulfill the expectations of most French people and why the party's share in the election vote dropped from 20 to 11 percent was the great subject of the 15th Congress and of the discussions preceding it for several months. [passage omitted]

The congress also tried to provide answers to many other important issues, one of them being the discussion about the form of the socialism that is consistent with the national specifics of France. [passage omitted]

In theory all these issues could have created deep divisions in the PCF, especially under the conditions in which it found itself, following a sharp drop in its influence. However, such divisions did not occur. The so-called contesters who abstained from voting on the congress documents numbered only a small fraction of the congress delegates. They were allowed to present their position at the congress and some of them, including Pierre Juquin, a former Politburo member, were elected to the Central Committee. [passage omitted]

The same French mass media that previously expected that there may be a deep disruption within the PCF, have suddenly "discovered" that the PCF is united on all basic ideological and political issues, including the approach to the socialist countries. Anyone who studied the congress documents must have concluded that the PCF continues to contribute important experience to the communist and workers movement. The PCF's searches for the French edition of socialism and its complete independence in choosing its own way and in evaluating the achievements of the socialist countries do not amount to renouncing internationalist class solidarity, an extensive cooperation, exchanges of experience, and bilateral and multilateral discussions [with these countries].

The representatives of about 100 communist and workers parties who attended the congress noted this approach with pleasure and expressed justified hopes that a new cooperation with the PCF was in the offing. As far as their domestic and international orientation is concerned, the French communists have the best chances of remaining the party they have always been--a party of importance within its own country and in the international communist movement.

CSO: 2600/637

POLAND

CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL COMMENTS ON SOLIDARITY, EDUCATION

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 4, 27 Jan 85 p 3

[Interview with Czeslaw Strzeszewski, professor of Christian philosophy at Lublin Catholic University, by Marian Pilka; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] You are the last member of the Mechlin Union in Poland. What significance did this group have in the development of Catholic social thought?

[Answer] The Mechlin Union came into being in 1920 under the patronage of Cardinal Mercier, the primate of Belgium, and every succeeding primate of that country has been its ex officio chairman. However, the last chairman, Cardinal Suenens, was elected. The union was composed of the most renowned Catholic thinkers and activists, including Johannes Messner, Amintore Fanfani, Charles Flori, Paul van Zeland, Oswald Nell-Breuning and Joseph Hofner. Poland was represented by Rev Antoni Szymanski and Ludwik Gorski. After the Second World War, Professor Henryk Dembinski and I became members of the union.

The union was an international academic group and dealt mainly with the compilation of codes of social morality based on church teachings. The union published several such codes, namely social and family codes and those on political, international and cultural morality. The latter was published only in fragments. Besides the codes, lesser works devoted to specific issues were published. The last chairman, Cardinal Suenens, did not disband the union, but merely suspended its activity after Paul VI's appointment of the papal "Iustitia et Pax" committee and the establishment of several national committees. For he accepted that these institutions would supersede the Mechlin Union in their work.

[Question] Have the codes been translated into other languages?

[Answer] They were all translated but only the social code was translated into Polish.

[Question] On what was the concept of the union itself based?

[Answer] From today's point of view, the concept of the union is somewhat outdated. It was assumed that there exist in the church's teachings immutable social and moral principles that should be applied to concrete social reality and that they are morally binding. For there exists an immutable Catholic social doctrine that should be applied regardless of time and space.

[Question] The doctrine of corporatism dominated at that time.

[Answer] The corporational concept had its long history in social thought but it achieved the status of a binding doctrine only in 1931 when Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno," emphatically condemned compulsory fascist corporations while encouraging the creation of voluntary organizations uniting employers as well as employees. As a further consequence, the development of corporations was seen not only in the socio-economic sphere but also--and this was an exaggeration--in the political sphere. For they were supposed to constitute parliamentary representation, at least in part.

[Question] What was the relationship of social doctrine to the master of the church? Does the quality of papal infallibility apply to social education?

[Answer] The church does not ascribe infallibility to the pope in all matters, only in matters of faith and morals. Therefore, although social doctrine springs from the principles of the gospels, its acceptance or rejection is not an obligation of conscience. However, a lay Catholic is obliged to consider such teachings and apply them properly in action.

[Question] In Poland in the interwar period, Catholic social education in its essential scope influenced the intellectual and social life of the country.

[Answer] You expressed that too bluntly. I do not see a strong influence by that education on Polish society. It was just clearing a path for itself. The statements of the primate's Social Council, which one could say had a certain influence, were published in 1934. But political parties were hardly familiar with Catholic thought. The National Party, for example, was under the influence of positivist doctrines and only in the 30's did Catholic elements infiltrate its program. The Christian Democrats were insufficiently intellectualized and many members were inadequately familiar with the social teachings of the church, although there were distinguished experts on the subject, i.e., Korfany. Other parties actually had little in common with Christianity. In Poland positivist trends in intellectual life simply dominated longer than in other countries.

[Question] The Catholic University of Lublin was the exception?

[Answer] It was the only academic center where a reconciliation between faith and the requirements of scientific work was attempted. Rev Rector Antoni Szymanski, the illustrious expert on social politics, gave Lublin University its social character. He assembled such scholars as

Czeslaw Martyniak, Pawel Skwarczynski, Ludwik Gorski and Henryk Gorski on the faculty. This group not only studied specific issues scientifically, but also educated the young generation of Catholic social activists.

[Question] You mentioned the primate's Social Council. What was its function?

[Answer] It was established in 1934. It assembled a group of distinguished experts on Catholic social education. Its president was Rev Szymanski and it was composed of Professors Leopold Caro and Ludwik Gorski, Bishop Teodor Kubina, Rev Jan Piwowarczyk and several representatives of Catholic Action, including Rev Wladyslaw Lewandowicz and Rev Broz. The council dealt with consideration of the reforms that should be introduced in the economic, social and political life of Poland in accordance with Christian principles. It issued a series of statements. The most important of these was its statement on the agricultural system. It declared that changes in the villages should aim above all for lasting improvements in culture, land reclamation, integration, etc. It also encouraged the breakup of large estates, naturally with appropriate compensation. It produced great indignation from the gentry. The president of Catholic Action, Count Bninski, tendered his resignation in protest. Another statement that played a significant role was devoted to proletarianism. It demanded a share for workers in the profits and property of an enterprise and participation in management. It offered a solution to growing contemporary social problems through the so-called work actionariat. It acknowledged the need for fighting unemployment through, for example, making occupational changes possible and creating small businesses. According to that statement, compensation should be of a family wage nature. This is a general principle of Christian social thought. It also acknowledged the right of workers to trade unions independent of the state.

[Question] After World War II various social initiatives inspired by Catholic thought were subject to radical limitation or liquidation. Catholic thought itself, through a lack of publishing capacity, lost its influence on the social consciousness of Catholics.

[Answer] That didn't happen at once. At first the Labor Party was still functioning and because of it, some possibility for the development of Christian social thought existed. But that was short-lived. Catholic organizations were suspended or closed. Catholic socio-intellectual life came to a standstill. The only center that continued to persevere and flourish was Lublin University. There was a department of Law and Social Sciences where Christian thought could be developed in various disciplines. I organized a colloquium on rural social and economic issues which was to prepare social activists in the villages for the villages. Bishop Stefan Wyszyński, among others, lectured in that colloquium. But the department and colloquium were dissolved by the state authorities in 1951 and 1952.

[Question] Lublin University was known at that time for hiring professors who had been dismissed from state schools. In your case it was the opposite; you had to leave the university.

[Answer] In 1952, seven professors were dismissed. Rev Antoni Slomkowski was the rector then and I was the deputy rector. The ministry demanded our resignation. Then elections were held in which Rev Jan Nowicki was chosen rector. Then Rev Jozef Iwanicki was elected, actually appointed, rector. We were dismissed during his term. The point was to shut us off from influence on young people, since we had been able to oppose the dominant trends of the time.

[Question] After 1956 you returned to work at Lublin University. You attempted to rebuild Catholic social studies.

[Answer] I went back to work, not in the Department of Law and Socio-economic Sciences, which had been liquidated, but in the Department of Christian Philosophy, where I headed the Christian sociology chair. Under that name we worked to develop Catholic social thought. At the request of Primate Wyszynski I undertook the writing of a new textbook in that discipline, which for reasons beyond my control was published in Paris in 1964 under the pseudonym Stanislaw Jarocki. The book is in textbook form and encompasses all the issues of the church's social teachings. Meanwhile, in 1978, I published in Poland under my own name the book "Human Work: Social and Moral Issues" and then my work "Property: Social and Moral Issues." My first pupil and the co-founder of what is often called the Lublin School was Rev Jozef Majka, today the rector of the Papal Department of Theology in Wroclaw. At that time there were great numbers at my seminar. The number of students often reached 40, the majority of them priests. From that seminar emerged many scholars, including Rev Joachim Kondziela, Rev Witold Zdaniewicz, Rev Tadeusz Koczwara, Rev Franciszek Mazurek, Rev Jan Krucina, Rev Wladyslaw Piwowarski, Rev Stanislaw Styrna, Rev Adam Broniecki and many others. A major problem for us was the lack of our own publication. Articles appeared mainly in the Scientific Journals of Lublin University. On the other hand the Social Science Yearbook experienced major publishing difficulties so that during the first two decades only two volumes were published. But since the mid-70's they have been appearing regularly and without difficulty.

[Question] What is the nature of the school you established?

[Answer] In my didactic work I've tried to interest my students in the various disciplines of social science. I did not limit myself to one specialty or one style of inquiry. My students deal with extremely diverse issues; for example, the problems of peace, human rights, Catholic social principles, the problems of the common good, personalism, criticism of schools of economics, the history of social thought and activism in the church, etc.

[Question] In the 70's we had to deal with particular upheaval in the entire church. The council took place and its consequences also affected social doctrine.

[Answer] After the council it seemed that Catholic social doctrine stopped having a reason to exist since previously it had been treated as an immutable doctrine whose specific principles could be realized in all countries. After the council, even a little earlier, since John XXIII's encyclicals "Mater et Magistra" and "Pacem in Terris," this doctrine assumed a pastoral, ministerial nature.

[Question] What does that mean?

[Answer] It means that it is not a doctrine pointing to social and economic solutions, immutable in time and space. It is based on recommendations, advice and suggestions that should be considered by lay people. But because the consequences of their realization depend to a large extent on local conditions, the Holy See recommends consulting with local episcopates on specific matters. Let us take, for example, the issue of fair wages. They are based on many elements. This issue includes not only earnings, but also working conditions, and not only economic conditions, but social, cultural and political as well. Only against this broad background can one talk about the nature of fair wages.

[Question] In 1968 you were appointed chairmain of the Polish "Iustitia et Pax" committee.

[Answer] That occurred on the basis of the decision of the Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate, since the committee was viewed as a continuation of the prewar Social Council of the primate of Poland and besides Cardinal Wyszynski I was the only living member. The committee's task was to work up proposals for social letters, i.e., letters of the episcopate on peace day, and give opinions on the problems of socio-economic life in Poland at the request of church authorities. Recently the government's proposal for a labor code was evaluated. The church's assistant was Archbishop Boleslaw Kominek. Because the new regulations of the Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate provided that only bishops could be chairmen of particular committees, Cardinal Kominek became chairman and I became vice chairman. After Cardinal Kominek's death the chairmanship changed frequently. Bishop Jozef Glomp, now primate of Poland, was one of them and Bishop Stanislaw Szymecki is currently chairman.

[Question] Some called this doctrine "the third way."

[Answer] I was always opposed to defining it in those terms. Because capitalism, for example, is not a doctrine that can be set against another, but rather a specific historical phenomenon. On the other hand, liberal doctrine, often acknowledged as the ideological basis of capitalism, as well as socialist doctrines in their assumptions, are contrary to the Christian system of values. The church is not attempting to create a new system. It never encouraged the liquidation of capitalism, merely its reform in the spirit of religious values. Moreover, recent popes have emphasized the need for cooperation with all people of good will regardless of their political or philosophical convictions. For the church wants dialog, finding a number of benefits in it. We Catholics feel that although our religious truth is unique,

in secular matters, in social, cultural, political and economic spheres, we should be prepared to accept the observations and recommendations of others too, and to cooperate with liberals and socialists.

[Question] Among American neo-conservatives, there are emerging charges that the church's contemporary social thought is developing under the influence of socialist ideas.

[Answer] That is false inspiration. For example, John Paul II says in "Laborem exercens" that work perfects a human being, that he fulfills himself through it. This appears to be close to Marxist doctrine, which says that we owe the process of humanization to work. But the dignity of human work in the Christian concept arises from personalism, from the fact that it is human work and through work a person shares in the process of creation and redemption. Christian thought harmoniously binds the lofty dignity of man to the common good. John Paul II's statement on the subject of work should be understood in an analogical, not material sense, in the entire context of his teachings. On the other hand, one could derive almost any interpretation from scattered excerpts.

[Question] You once expressed the opinion that Solidarity lost because it did not apply the principles of church social doctrine in its affairs.

[Answer] That way of putting it is too one-sided. This is a very complex question. One of the elements of its defeat was certainly a lack of familiarity with that doctrine. Our society formed its social, economic and political notions under the influence of the prevailing Marxist doctrine and this manifested itself in 1980-81.

[Question] In what sense then can one say that a lack of familiarity and non-application of the principles of Catholic doctrine had an effect on the defeat of Solidarity?

[Answer] In the sense in which the primate admonished Solidarity, showing it a course of action. He said it is necessary to work cautiously and quietly, to first grow strong internally, to deal first of all with occupational, not political issues. Social science teaches realistic thinking, thinking that takes into account various limitations and proposes evolutionary, gradual solutions. With Solidarity we had to deal with a faulty assessment of the scope of activity of the trade union in a socialist state.

[Question] Currently we have to deal with a growing interest in Catholic social doctrine in Poland.

[Answer] Not only in Poland, but also in West Germany and Austria. In our country, however, that interest does not always produce the desired results. For social doctrine has a multi-disciplinary nature, requiring philosophical, theological, social and economic preparation. And currently it often happens that people who just a few years ago renounced that doctrine are now giving lectures or writing articles on

the subject. This often leads to simplistic, superficial formulas that hinder its popularization rather than help it. But generally speaking, this growth of interest shows an understanding of the need to base social development on solid moral foundations.

[----] Law of 31 July 1981 on the control of publications and performances art 2 point 1, 2 (DZIENNIK USTAW no 20 item 99, amended 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW no 44, item 204)

12776

CSO: 2600/523

POLISH UNION OPPOSITION TO MINISTER ON PRICE HIKES

LD250240 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 24 Feb 85

[Text] The rejection by the Polish National Trade Union Accord (OPZZ) of price hikes planned for the beginning of next month was referred to in an interview given by a government minister in Warsaw. Our correspondent Jozsef Laszlo outlines the interview:

The Polish Government agrees with the trade unions in their view that the balance of the domestic market should be established not through price increases but by increasing productivity and output. However, in the present circumstances the price increases appear to be unavoidable. This is the gist of what Stanislaw Ciosek, minister of trade union affairs, said on Polish television news.

The government is not in an easy position, Ciosek said, although the trade unions' decision was not unexpected. When the government makes its decision on Monday, it will take into account the results of the consultations, the views of individual bodies of experts and, naturally, the standpoint of the trade unions. However, it should not be expected that, in addition to the four options for higher prices already outlined, there is a fifth or a sixth version in reserve. If the price increases are delayed now, it would have to be paid for later. This payment would take the form of slowing down the favorable processes and a delay in the abolition of rationing, the minister said. He also said that the government took into account the problems of the most disadvantaged social groups in position and, in accordance with its possibilities, was trying to alleviate them.

So, the Polish Government will make a decision on the price increase on Monday which will not be easy. However, let me call attention to a very important aspect of the standpoint adopted by the trade unions. Although the OPZZ rejected the price increases, it did not threaten to stage any strikes or protest actions.

CSO: 2500/264

PREPARATION OF CHEMICAL TROOPS FOR MASS DESTRUCTION CONDITIONS

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH in Polish No 12, Dec 84 pp 85-87

[Article by Mjr Andrzej Kaczmarek, PhD: "Psycho-physical Training of Soldiers in the Chemical Troops"]

[Text] The development of weapons of mass destruction and the continuous improvement of battle equipment for the chemical troops pose novel, qualitatively higher demands on soldiers. The organization of educational and training processes must correspond to the requirements of the modern battlefield. As a result, the demands placed on soldiers constantly grow in such important spheres as ideology, morality, character, and physical and intellectual fitness. Soldiers in the chemical troops will have to perform battle assignments in contaminated areas, amidst destruction and fires. They not only will have to do this when the enemy weapons of mass destruction strike directly on the area where they are stationed, but also, with full awareness of the danger, they will be forced to enter zones of contamination, destruction, and fire in order to fulfill their tasks.

Alongside the greater intensity of factors having a negative impact on the psychological functioning of soldiers in the chemical troops, one must expect a significant degradation of cognitive processes and greater difficulties in carrying out battle assignments.

Disorders of perception, speech, memory, and thinking may appear in extreme cases. Behaviorally, states bordering on panic, simulation, susceptibility to gossip, slacking of discipline, etc., may occur.

It can be expected that the worst negative effects will be caused by nuclear explosions. Visual and aural effects accompanying nuclear strikes will have a great impact on soldier psyche.

Several conclusions concerning the impact of nuclear weapons on the soldier's psychology and his behavior on the battlefield may be drawn from the reports of psychological reactions among the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The aural and visual effects of the explosion will have effect at larger distances from ground zero than the physical range of the factors of destruction.

Within a radius of 5 to 10 kilometers from ground zero, aural and visual effects may cause fear of another attack, fear of death from radiation (especially

if neutron weapons are used), and fear of staying within the zone of radioactive contamination. Some soldiers may exhibit a desire to flee from the area of their deployment. Psychological experiences may be intensified by participating in rescue and evacuation efforts.

Soldiers in the chemical troops carry out most of their tasks in protective clothes or equipment. Experience shows that the long-term use of such equipment causes fast physical and psychological exhaustion, as well as constant tension which can precipitate massive disturbances, acute states of stupor, hysterical syndromes, depression and apathy.

Areas struck by nuclear or incendiary weapons will suffer widespread fires. Windward areas will be shrouded in smoke. Conducting activities in such places will require constant high tension, focused attention, psychological endurance and high level of skill by drivers.

Psycho-physical endurance¹ in a soldier means a state of reduced sensitivity or diminished reaction to all kinds of stimuli that interfere with effective functioning. It is formed, among other things, through adaptation, training, etc.; it plays a great role in difficult situations, such as danger or overload.

Perseverance, stamina, courage, resourcefulness, self-control, ability to take risks, psychological hardiness, and the ability to carry out tasks for a long time in individual protective clothing are all indispensable characteristics of a chemical troops soldier.

The appearance of psychological weakness or undesirable behavior depends on several factors, including the soldier's moral and political awareness, psychological preparedness for performing tasks in difficult conditions, training and physical condition.

The shaping of desired psycho-physical endurance is a long and complex process. Projected results cannot be achieved solely through special tactical training. Educational efforts and personal example set by superiors play the main role in the process of shaping psycho-physical endurance in soldiers.

Educational activity aimed at the creation of exemplary discipline and bonds with the collective is an important factor in overcoming fear. An important function in the overall structure of education and training is played by the personal example set by the commander. His courage, stamina, resourcefulness and ability to control fear set an example to be followed by his subordinates.

The shaping of psycho-physical endurance constitutes an important goal of educational activity. Here, an important role is played by the ideological, moral and psychological preparation of soldiers for performing tasks in conditions dangerous to life.

1. "Lexicon of Military Knowledge," Ministry of National Defense Publishers, Warsaw, 1979.

Consciousness and approval of the purposes of struggle, a sense of importance attached to assignments being performed, readiness to help, the ability to sacrifice, responsibility for life and health of comrades-in-arms, trust in commanders and confidence in technical equipment operated in the battle should always be emphasized in party-political and command work with all soldiers.

Special Tactical Training

Special tactical and technical training exerts great influence on the shaping of psycho-physical endurance. Proper specialist training constitutes an important psychological factor in armed struggle. Faith in one's own strength and abilities, as well as confidence in military equipment being operated, will facilitate the overcoming of psychological effects of the modern battlefield.

Preservation of good physical condition and health is an indispensable condition which makes it possible to perform tasks in especially strenuous situations. It is an objective set before physical training where soldiers can perfect such necessary attributes as courage, resourcefulness, self-control, and stamina.

Among the goals of fire training is to teach the ability to shoot accurately in individual protective clothing. First aid training should teach soldiers to help the wounded and the shocked, and to use antidotes and preparations protecting against irradiation. Special emphasis must be placed on acquainting soldiers, according to their assigned functions, with the necessary knowledge of physiology of fear. Familiarity with the mechanisms and causes of fear, and the ability to control it (especially collective fear) may, in a decisive moment, determine the ability to achieve battle objectives, especially by units charged with contamination reconnaissance.

The need to follow the principle of realism of future battlefields imposes important duties on the chief of training. His task is to choose appropriate training problems, create difficult and non-stereotyped battle exercise situations, graduate the length of exercises performed in strenuous conditions, and select proper means of simulating the battlefield. Rational planning of these endeavors makes it possible to achieve the desired effects in psycho-physical preparation of soldiers for performing on the modern battlefield. It is understandable that in the conditions of training the troops in peacetime it is difficult to foresee and simulate all circumstances that may occur on a battlefield. The organizer of training must always remember the cost-benefit ratio, and must insure safe conditions.

Demonstrations of toxic substances' effects on live organisms, as well as the effectiveness of antidotes, make the greatest psychological impression on the trained soldiers. The combination of such demonstrations with exercises in a gas chamber develops trainees' confidence in individual protective equipment. This creates appropriate conditions for overcoming the barrier of fear, which in turn is necessary for special tactical training utilizing the means of battlefield simulation. Training soldiers on a napalm tract demonstrates the

nature of the danger, builds confidence in the protective qualities of individual safety equipment, and allows the molding of courage, self-control, stamina, and resourcefulness.

Past experience and assessments of the danger of contamination show an absolute need for rigorous adherence to the norms concerning long stays in protective clothing in different atmospheric conditions. One should realize that any deviation from these norms strikes directly at the battle preparedness of a soldier. In conducting such training one must remember to follow the principle of gradation of difficulty or the maximum permissible time for wearing individual safety clothing which depend, among other things, on atmospheric conditions (mainly air temperature).

Departures from the principle of gradation of difficulty may only bring negative consequences. One incident of oversaturating an exercise with physically and psychologically strenuous situations may cause psychological inhibitions, dejection, or even breakdown among the less resistant soldiers.

The shaping of endurance for long-lasting activities in individual protective clothing requires systematic training. For this reason, exercises which complement education programs play an important role.

Taking proper care of the technical condition and cleanliness of individual protective equipment should always remain at the center of attention of commanders and individual users. Good condition and proper fitting of individual protective equipment insure safety during activities in contaminated terrain.

Valuable qualities of character and psycho-physical endurance are created in the process of education and training, not only when the battle is on. Psycho-physical endurance training of soldiers in the chemical troops, which prepares them for activities in the contamination, destruction and fire zones, constitutes an important element of education and training. There is a need for integration of multifaceted activities. Only broad, systematic actions may bring the desired results.

12503
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YOUTH UNION CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED ON UNION INFLUENCE

AU191529 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Feb 85 p 3

[Interview with Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Union of Polish Socialist Youth (ZSMP) by Ryszard Naleszkiewicz: "Showing The Young Generation The Way"--date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Naleszkiewicz: How do people count with the union's opinion on general, political, social, and economic matters? Are you in a position to effectively represent young people's interests?

Szmajdzinski: It varies. Our postulates concerning the new rules behind credits for young married couples have not been taken into account. It was the same with the drastic reduction of educational courses for working people. In general matters it is different. The catalog of most important problems facing the young generation that was adopted following the Third ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] Congress was almost the entire basis for the "youth" sections of the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress, and Ninth Central Committee Plenum, and for the government program for improving young people's start in social and professional life. To this extent, therefore, we have fulfilled our function as spokesman for the interests of the young generation. The situation concerning detailed solutions varies, but the activity of the Council of Ministers Youth Affairs Committee always plays a positive role. The committee controls the implementation of this program, points out errors, reminds and corrects people. Delays are sometimes justified by the state's economic situation and sometimes not.

Naleszkiewicz: Does the committee heed your voice?

Szmajdzinski: Let me give a recent example. We were presented with a program of social benefits for young families, worked out by the labor ministry. It was meant to be a program of the "future." On our recommendation, the document was withdrawn immediately. On this topic, one cannot be ignorant of what will happen in 3 years time and formulate everything conditionally. Greater clarity and more specifics are needed. We do not want promises, but a definition of real chances and prospects.

Naleszkiewicz: Sociological tests reveal that some young people remain reluctant to undertake social activity, lack confidence, and adopt a critical attitude. The extent of these moods is gradually diminishing, but even so it is

still significant. In the face of this difficult situation, are you not threatened with a thinning of your ranks?

Szmajdzinski: This we already have behind us--there is definitely no danger. In 1983 we accepted 217,000 new members into the ZSMP, most of them at the youngest possible age, whereas in 1984 we accepted about 300,000. This is still not causing a growth in our ranks because a similar number of people are leaving when they exceed the "organization's" age of 35 years, but we are no longer threatened with a reduction.

CSO: 2600/638

POLAND

BRIEFS

NEW UNDERSECRETARY--On the recommendation of the minister of foreign affairs, the chairman of the Council of Ministers has appointed Dr Jan Majewski under-secretary of state in this ministry. [Excerpt] [AU132029 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Feb 85 p 5]

POLISH-MONGOLIAN COOPERATION--Another meeting of experts from the central planning bodies of Poland and Mongolia has commenced in Warsaw, on the coordination of the 1986-90 economic plans. The Polish delegation is being chaired by Stanislaw Dlugosz, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Planning Commission, and the Mongolian delegation by Shilegiyn Lpagwaa, deputy chairman of Mongolia's State Planning Committee. [Excerpt] [AU132029 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Feb 85 p 2]

FIRST GOMULKA MUSEUM--The first museum in Poland to commemorate Wladyslaw Gomułka was opened in Krosno on 6 February to mark the 80th anniversary of his birth. Gomułka lived in Krosno until 1926. [Summary] [AU132029 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Feb 85 pp 1, 2]

WEEKLY'S NEW EDITOR IN CHIEF--Kazimierz Kozniewski, editor in chief of TV I TERAZ weekly retired today. Klemens Krzyzagorski, chairman of the Main Board of the Association of Journalists of the Polish PR (SDPRL), and hitherto editor in chief of the PRASA POLSKA is the new editor in chief of the weekly. [Text] [LD190234 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 18 Feb 85]

CSO: 2600/639

ROMANIA

FAULTY HEALTH EDUCATION BLAMED FOR HIGH ABORTION RATE

Bucharest VIATA MEDICALA in Romanian Nov 84 pp 255-260

[Article by Dr V. Lisovschi, Prof I. Dorobantu, Bucharest Institute for Hygiene and Public Health]

[Text] The values of education in determining of the condition of health have long been attested. The ramifications of the educational effort in conditioning the biohereditary, demographic, sanitary or economic factors, responsible for the evolution of the condition of health, are unanimously and very positively appreciated. However, among these, the demographic factor is considered to be the primary potential beneficiary of education. In the dynamics of demographic phenomena, in the population statics and dynamics, education can become essential, fostering opinions and ideas, channeling energies, shaping behaviors, governing in sanitary culture the factor of demographic conduct, which perhaps is the paramount one of the concept.

A "direct finite product" of health education, health measures: can influence the level of population, developing a rapid or slow rate of increase; can prevent demographic aging, energizing natality, the infusion of youth in the working population; can attenuate or cancel the adverse effects of the mechanical and pendular movement -- of migration and commuting -- on demographic conduct.

But the most spectacular educational finalization in population dynamics can be achieved in the area of natural movement and regeneration of the population, of its reproduction which, as is known, produces new generations and, in its interaction with mortality of those whose potential has been exhausted, influences the balance, the natural increase in population. When making this statement we have in mind the possibilities of influencing, through education, some dependent variables -- biophysiological and social ones -- that condition reproduction.

In this light, outstanding are three educational facets, three essential educational and sanitary objectives.

1. The first objective: reproduction -- increase in the reproduction level, in reproduction intensity, improvement of indices on marriage and divorce, fecundity and fertility, which are impacted by a number of factors also conditioned by the level of sanitary education, by the couple's concept on demographic phenomena, in the final analysis by health education.

2. The second objective: infant mortality -- reduction of infant mortality, with special emphasis on decreasing early fetal mortality, abortions and on lowering postneonatal mortality rate, which is predominantly influenced by the educational factor, the level of sanitary education primarily, then the other factors -- socioeconomic, biophysiological, genetic-hereditary ones -- in distinction from neonatal mortality, where the influences exerted by the factors involved proceed inversely in the value scale, with the genetic factor being first impacted, and the cultural factor situated last.

3. The third objective: natural increase -- rise in the natural increase as a result of the interaction of reproduction with mortality, of the birth rate with mortality rate -- infant and general -- which, in their turn are conditioned, influenced by potential factors that are beneficiaries of sanitary culture, implicitly of health education.

For an estimation of the potential for attainment of these objectives, a few parameters of the dynamics of demographic phenomena are necessary to provide a basis for a realistic examination of this potential.

Recent research data and official information sources demonstrate that, in this light, education (still) has a widefield of action open.

To illustrate this suffice it to merely recall the fact that in the world, the incidence of incomplete abortions ranges between 30 and 50 million cases annually, out of which more than 50 percent are induced abortions, as they are unwanted pregnancies.

In this country, out of the more than 5.330 million fecund women only about 900,000 procreate, with the fecundity rate hence keeping low, 144 for each 1000 fecund women. From these procreating women, only a little over 400,000 -- consequently a little over 40 percent -- bring their pregnancy to completion, winding up with live newborn, while the rest -- more than half -- lose the product of conception, in most cases by termination of pregnancy.

Significant in this regard is the situation recorded in 1983. Out of the 742,000 pregnant women only 320,614 brought their pregnancy to completion, while the rest, 421,386 representing about 60 percent, lost the product of conception as a result of termination of pregnancy.

The data provided point out two matters that affect the sphere of education, of culture in general and of sanitary culture in particular:

a. The low fecundity rate: out of 1000 women capable of procreating, only 144 procreate. A reasonable question arises: What happens to the remaining 850 women capable of procreating? They must be subjected to education, because the fecundity rate has great resources for increase, regardless of the factors with reduced potential, of the potential aggressions that might be exerted reducing the number of these women.

b. The very high number of pregnancy arrests: 1311 for each 1000 live-born or, differently expressed, "for one live-born there were about 1.5 arrests of pregnancies." The in-depth examination of this index illustrates not only the negative aspect mentioned above, according to which more than half of pregnancies are lost, but also the fact that, while 52.4 percent of these are in accordance with legal provisions and involve medically assisted termination, the rest of 47.6 percent are officially registered as incomplete -- spontaneous abortions. But, as indicated by specialists, only 9 percent are spontaneous or justified abortions, generated by medical causes.

Hence, incomplete abortions are an object of education for two reasons: either they actually are spontaneous and in this case complex measures -- including educational ones -- are required for preservation of pregnancy; or they are the effect of an aggression and require firm educational actions to eliminate the risks to which the woman subjects her body by abortive practices.

The further data which we provide tellingly illustrate the necessary educational programs for combating abortive practices.

The review of abortions in light of live-born leads to the conclusion that in most cases (94.5 percent), it is not the number of children that is the mobile of the abortive conduct, as 19.9 percent are childless women, 29.9 percent only have one child, 32.4 percent -- two children, 12.3 percent -- three children, and only 5.5 percent -- four, five or more children.

The review of the marital status indicates that 89.9 percent of women have the married status, the motivation of nonfulfillment on this level consequently being excluded.

Lastly, the review according to age groups indicates that most pregnancy terminations occur between the ages with the greatest biological potential (between 20 and 24 years -- 450.3 for each 1000 live-born; between the ages of 25 and 29 -- 1381.4 for each 1000 live-born, and between 30 and 34 years -- 3461.6 for each 1000 live-born).

Beyond the statistical significance of these figures, their absolute value indicates the existence of unforeseen biological resources for the substantial increase in the birth rate and the rise in the natural increase. They also involve valuable objective indicators for the evaluation of the sanitary culture

of the female population -- and not only of the female one -- in regard to the demographic phenomena, indirectly spotlighting the implied deficiencies in the conceptual-demographic orientation of the couples.

Telling in this regard also are the results of a study which we conducted on representative samples of subjects from the town area, and which also recorded the options of the surveyed population on family planning. For instance, from the almost 10,000 subjects between the ages of 15 and 45, only 57.1 percent wish to have children, the remainder of 42.9 percent either state that they do not want to have children (41.6 percent) or do not answer (1.3 percent).

Most of the subjects that wish to have children opt for one child -- 47.8 percent and two children -- 45.9 percent; those who wish to have three and four children account for only 5 percent and 1.3 percent respectively.

The motivations collected from the subjects who do not wish to have children, the 41.6 percent, involve, in the sequence of frequency, the fact that:

- a. They have other children: 60.3 percent;
- b. They do not like children: 12.5 percent;
- c. They are past the appropriate age: 7.1 percent;
- d. They lack the material conditions: 5.1 percent;
- e. They do not provide reasons: 5 percent.

The detailed survey of the 60.3 percent subjects who based their refusal to have children on the fact that they have children in their families led to the finding that 87.1 percent only have one child.

The data, without comments, simply lead to clear conclusions on sanitary culture, the demographic outlook of the population surveyed.

As a result of the situations presented in regard to the outlook in the area of family planning, fecundity and termination of pregnancy, fertility in 1983 is illustrated by a general rate which, in our view, is very low: 59.6 percent live-born for each 1000 fecund women. Evidently, the educational services that would be performed for changes in the area of conceptual-demographic orientation, fecundity and termination of pregnancy would implicitly influence the fertility rate.

A demographic indicator of indisputable value, the natural increase in population, with all its components -- liveborn, stillborn, natural increase, marriages and divorces, stillborn and deaths under 1 year of age -- points out, in light of current indexes, major availabilities for improvement.

For instance, there is a considerable decline in the birth rate -- 14.3 per thousand inhabitant -- and involves still increased rates -- 23.9 per thousand of live-born -- for infant mortality, as is known, placing this country among the last in the infant mortality chart in Europe.

A closer review of data even more tellingly points out the fact that prominent among the factors responsible for these situations are the deficiencies in health education. Significant in this respect are the data on postneonatal mortality, which stands at 14.7 per thousand. Telling is the fact that only 9.2 percent are born with biological stock and that 14.7 percent come into the world with a good genetic background, but the general tending conditions provided by the family -- among them those pertaining to behavior stand out -- cause losing them.

The input of the educational factor in the context of the measures apt to bring the curve of demographic indicators to the desired level is regarded as being considerable. This thesis is promoted by the wealth of data which we collected from observation and current activity, attesting the direct correlation between health education deficiencies and the improper evolution of infant mortality and morbidity rates.

Ample casuistic information, for instance, illustrates the fact that in most deaths of under one-year olds caused by bronchopneumonia and toxic dyspepsia the infectious factor is frequently associated with the low level of health education, materialized in failure to recognize incipient symptomatology and ignorance of elementary measures in taking care of the baby.

We believe that the data presented are edifying in terms of the need for health education and ties any tendency to minimize health education, in any form it may manifest itself, to undertones directly linked to medical deontology.

In this context, it amply follows that there is the need, relevance for firm educational actions, capable of maximizing the options in favor of motherhood and optimizing the set of preventive measures within the framework of preconceptual, prenatal and postnatal prophylaxis.

These health education influences meant to produce the required changes in the current structure of sanitary culture on the topic discussed can no longer be limited to sporadic steps or steps involving routine, dispersed forms, within the framework of services occasioned by passive assistance dispensed on request. It is imperative that these influences be part of active medical care, of preventive medicine, of medicine of the healthy person, and also of the prophylactic and therapeutical program, in the context of periodical and systematic projects and events, under a permanent program, a complex educational system, with a broad embracing area, for involvement of all parties concerned and for full tackling of the contents, by most efficient intertwining of the most diverse methods and forms of influencing, with possibility of using, to this end,

the whole array of human communication means, with the technicality, proficiency and importance which they deserve, like any other action of purest medical essence.

Further we present the makeup of such a program, based on methods of health education on problems of demography, mother, child and youth welfare.

When speaking of the makeup of a complex educational system, we have in mind four distinct chapters: objectives, organization, contents and means.

In the context of the system involved, we focus on direct and indirect objectives. Significant among direct objectives are elevating the health education standard in terms of the informative and formative level and changes in the demographic outlook of the population. The indirect objectives are: improvement of demographic indicators and harmonious development of children aged between 0-3 years.

The organization chapter includes: the groups of population involved; start of application of the system; organization technique; duration of application and staff needed.

The contents differ according to the groups of population involved: persons directly concerned (the woman during maternity, her family, single young women and men, premarital couples, recently formed families, childless families); the staff in mother-infant care units (specifically nurseries and creches); voluntary health care active.

Worthy of stress is the existence of some sociocultural and economic factors capable of hampering the educational messages, of making reproduction contingent, factors that generate a number of educational priorities, whose tackling in the cultural-educational context may counter their negative impacts in the sphere of demographic phenomena.

Evidently -- confronted with the existence of sociocultural and sanitary factors with hampering effect in the area of assimilating information, of influences pro-familia, and with some objective genetic, constitutional or biophysiological causes, that cause sterility -- the educational factor has a small audience, the messages emitted are weakly received.

This impels to searching, to figuring approaches to optimizing the educational effort, that can generate changes in the couple's outlook on demographic phenomena, even in the context of hampering factors.

Among chief directions of action, with a major role in orientating the detail thematics on health education in the demographic area, in the area of mother, child and youth welfare, we recall:

- a. Cultivation of the concept pro-familia;
- b. Restoring the value of the act of marriage by reconsideration of valuable elements such as:
 - 1. Engagement period of 3-6 months, with medical examination of the engaged couple;
 - 2. Complex (medical, social and effective) prenuptial examination;
 - 3. Festive -- not formal, commercial or propagandistic -- character of marriage;
- c. Active medicosocial dispensary care for the premarital couple or the recently formed family;
- d. Preparation for a proper family, by esthetic, moral, sexual education of the couple;
- e. Educational, social, sanitary assistance to the couple for resolving family problems, in all their diversity and complexity;
- f. Fostering of a love for children;
- g. Popularization of measures for conception and preservation of pregnancy, in light of the increased rate of incomplete abortions;
- h. Intensive popularization of measures for tending infants aged between 1-12 months, in light of the increased postneonatal death rate;
- i. Firm educational actions to improve addressability and care provided to sick children, in light of the high rate of deaths in the absence of physicians.

The educational means (instruction, demonstrations, incentives) differ in light of the three categories of addressability: persons directly concerned, staff in mother and child care units, voluntary care active.

Integration into current activity of such a complex educational system, on such a topical theme, is designed to enhance the quality of health education services and help to improve demographic indicators.

11710
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COMPOSITION OF POLITBURO DISCUSSED BY FRG PAPER

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 7 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Ceausescu's Manageable Politburo"]

[Text] In no other state of the Soviet Bloc are the leadership bodies so frequently tailor-made anew and reorganized according to the changing power calculation of the top man as they are in Romania. Ceausescu stands high above everything; his will decides everything. This starts from the fact that he who calls himself "Conducator" (Leader), holds in his hand an unusual number of offices. He is First Party Secretary (not: First Party Secretary of the Central Committee as in the other Communist countries); President and Chairman of the Council of State (an unusual doubling of the highest office in the state's apparatus); Chairman of the Council for National Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development (a body which supervises the ministries which deal with the economy); Chairman of the Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity (the all-embracing mass organization directed by the party whose existence amounts to nothing more than participation in meetings by officials), Chairman of the National Council of the Workers (which - above all - also only exists on paper and in offices).

In December Ceausescu changed the most important party group which is called, precisely, "The Permanent Office of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee", "The Permanent Office" for short. (Until 1974 the term was "Permanent Presidency"). This body can most readily be regarded as the Romanian Politburo. In Western publications one can read again and again that the Political Executive Committee is in reality the Politburo. However, several rationales speak out against this. The Political Executive Committee is today, with its 23 members and approximately 20 candidates, actually too large to guarantee the functions which the Politburo has to carry out in a Communist state. But, above all: if there is a more compact Permanent Office formed by the Political Executive Committee, with the Party Leader being one of its members, then one can draw the conclusion that this body is the real Politburo. Possibly many people are led astray by the fact that the word "political" appears in the title of the Executive Committee, which reminds them of the "Politburo".

The Permanent Buro, which up to now had 13 members, has had only eight since 11 December. Next to Ceausescu, the most important member is his wife Elena. To all appearances, she is the second most powerful personality in Romania. Moreover, she is First Deputy Prime Minister (to be sure, two other politicians have this position), Leader of the Cadre Commission of the Central Committee (and therefore, together with her husband, ruler of the staff policy in the land). Her further high offices are almost countless. For instance, Elena Ceausescu is in charge of the National Council for Science and Technology, the Scientific Council for Chemical Research, and the - less important - National Council for Science and Peace.

Two members of the Politburo are related by marriage to Ceausescu: Manea Manescu and Ilie Verdet. Manea Manescu is an old confidant of the party chief. After the war, he organized together with him [Ceausescu] the Communist Youth Organization and then worked in institutions which were generally dedicated to the science of economic research as well as scientific research. He only reached the forefront among party leaders under Ceausescu. He became prime minister in 1974. When he lost this position and thereafter his party functions, it was said that he had fallen out of favor with Ceausescu. However, it became known later that Manea Manescu had had to retire because of illness. In 1983 he had recovered to such an extent that he could return to the Political Executive Committee and could take over high public offices. As a member of the Politburo, he is now a member of the most powerful people under Ceausescu.

The same can be said of Verdet who, in 1979 had succeeded Manea Manescu in the office of prime minister but was relieved in May 1982. At that time, too, many spoke about his removal from office. Verdet was appointed to be one of the Deputy State Chairmen, which seemed like a parting with honors. However, only five months later Ceausescu appointed him as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. There is every reason to believe that in 1982 Ceausescu had transferred him rather than dismissing him, because he needed him somewhere else.

Further members of the Politburo include: Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu. For a long time he had been one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, and in 1979 he rose to the Political Executive Committee. When Ceausescu put him in at the head of the Council of Ministers in 1982, the country had not been in such deep economic difficulties for decades. Dascalescu could not make any decisive improvements, but the party leader seems to be satisfied with the personal commitment of the energetic man.

The First Deputy Prime Minister Gheorghe Oprea has been a member of the Politburo since 1974. He is supposed to be one of the most experienced economic experts in the party machinery and, for over a decade, seems to be the coordinator of economic policies together with the current prime minister.

Gheorghe Radulescu who has belonged to the Politburo since 1969, with some interruptions, became known in the 60's as Romania's Permanent Representative in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (RGW), the economic organization of the Soviet bloc. Above all, it was his job to personally assert the Romanian opposition against the Soviet plans for supernationalization of the RGW. For

more than one and a half decades he has been part of Ceausescu 's inner circle.

The member of the Politburo who is least known abroad is Emil Bobu. He was minister of the interior since 1974 and, at the top of the party, the head representative for security. He was appointed in 1979 chairman of the state labor union and appointed to the Politburo. He left his job with the labor union in 1981 and returned to the party machinery as secretary of the Central Committee.

Quite a few high functionaries who at one time had been Ceausescu's intimates and favorites do not sit in the Politburo any more. Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Gheorghe Pana, Cornel Burtica, Leonte Rautu -- one after another, they have fallen from favor and have been shunted off to second-class jobs or pensioned off. It is uncertain if the same can be said about Dumitru Popescu. He had started as chief editor of the party newspaper "SCINTEIA" (THE SPARK) and had a stormy ascent. At the end of the 60's Ceausescu gave him primary responsibility for ideology, culture, and propaganda; the highest party jobs were awarded to him. For a long time he seemed to be the second man in Bucharest, and he acted as if quite aware of his rank. He was called "God" in Romania because of his majestic and arrogant manner. This [sobriquet] expressed fear as well as mockery. He came into the Politburo in 1979, which at that time had 15 members, of course. It is hard to say what it means that Popescu is not part of the new and smaller Politburo. This could indicate a lessening degree of favor; but it could also be conceivable that Popescu has been entrusted with special tasks which would make it advisable not to burden him with the duties of a Politburo member as well.

12521

CSO: 2300/261

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

MINISTERIAL PERSONNEL CHANGES--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that the following comrades are relieved of their positions as deputy ministers of the chemical industry: Justin Rogoz and Ion Militaru and the following comrades are appointed deputy ministers of the chemical industry: Aristina Parota and Mihai Paraschiv. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 3, 28 Jan 85 p 2]

CSO: 2700/114

IVICA RACAN DISCUSSES STABILIZATION PROGRAM, PARTY PROBLEMS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 84 pp 7-10

[Extracts from NASE TEME interview with LCY Central Committee member Ivica Racan by Gojko Marinkovic: "Keys to the Crisis in the Hands of the LC"]

[Text] Ivica Racan, a member of the LCY Central Committee and the director of the LCY's Josip Broz Tito Political School, gave a lengthy interview to the magazine NASE TEME. We are presenting extensive extracts from this conversation, which was conducted by Gojko Marinkovic.

[Question] One of the questions addressed to Racan dealt with different positions on the implementation of the Long-Term Economic Stabilization Program. Specifically, some people consider it Holy Scripture, and others say that it is only a program of "fire-extinguishing measures," and so, after all of this, the ordinary citizen or LCY member remains confused.

[Answer] Currently there are different positions on the implementation of the Long-Term Economic Stabilization Program. It has become a "lithmus test" by which an entire spectrum of ideological-political positions and interests, different and often mutually opposed, are revealed in the ideological and political attitude toward it as a text and in the process of its implementation. If this is true, and if this is still continuing, then we probably have not done enough to have the Long-Term Program discussed, examined, and adopted in a more high-quality manner. There may be something from that widespread practice in an OUR [organization of associated labor], for example, when some SAS [Self-management agreement] is easily adopted, but it becomes controversial when it starts to be implemented (can some people be voting without even reading it?). But leaving frivolity aside, the program has been adopted, and in spite of certain omissions and inconsistencies, we have nothing better, and so it is binding for us. It would be much more significant to analyze how its implementation is going, but there our analyses are weaker. The focus of the discussion is the views of the program itself, and these are on the rise: from uncritical defense to rejection. There is a great deal of one-sided interpretation, depending on who likes what. The way in which the Long-Term Program is contrasted with the

Constitution and the ZUR [Law on Associated Labor] is significant. When some people do this they support it at the expense of the Constitution and the ZUR; others reject it in the name of the Constitution and the ZUR. And so it is these differences, and not the ones outside the LC, that are exacerbating many of the issues that we are discussing.

[Question] Suddenly the discussion turned to changes in the political system about which there are also many a priori and exclusive positions.

[Answer] The political system of socialist self-management in this country is not by any means voluntarism on anyone's part. It is the result of historical circumstances, and primarily, the great creative ability of the revolutionary forces of our peoples and nationalities to make real the prospects for freedom and the humanization of man and society. Thus, if the issue of "changing the political system of socialist self-management" is raised, then it is not a matter of changing just a few political mechanisms, but rather a question of changing socialist self-management production relations and the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] system for our multinational and federated Yugoslav community. Therefore, this difference between the formulation "changing the political system" and "changes in the political system," which appears so small and yet is so significant, is neither small nor insignificant, and I would say that it is of critical importance. One should not forget that there are also those who advocate changing the political system in the direction of the establishment of some sort of "third Yugoslavia." Therefore, in this discussion as well, we have to clear up the following: what position we are starting from, and what kind of changes we are advocating. But all of this is not opposed to the need to have a great deal of this changed along the basic lines of our commitment to building socialist self-management. After all, we said in our Program that nothing is so sacred that it could not be changed and made even better.

I am in favor of changes that ensure a better implementation of our strategy in building a socialist self-managing society, and in this regard one should also free oneself from certain illusions or erroneous solutions. If lie has shown that something does not serve this purpose or if real social processes require more creative and better solutions, I do not just accept this—I also support the need for critical reexamination of and changes in these solutions.

There is currently too much politicization and recognizable ideological-political advocacy in discussions about the political system. I think that instead of general polemics on whether to change the political system or not, and in accuracies that could have far-reaching consequences, it would be much, much better to engage ourselves, realistically and without prejudices, in a critical analysis of how the postulated political system is actually being implemented and what should be changed in it, and what has become a brake on the further development of socialist self-management. We need a serious and comprehensive analysis of this, and on that basis, a calm and sober discussion.

The basic starting point in the discussion of our political system should be distinguishing precisely what is what, and then analyzing whether we are unanimous on the nature of production relations: whether they are self-management ones, or whether someone, in changing the political system, would like to sanction and further strengthen the powerful trend of the statist regulation of social relations, or whether he would want a stronger development and affirmation of what in our society is bourgeois-restoration as a production relationships and a system of values.

[Question] The same thing happened with the Draft Conclusions from the 13th session, regarding which there are views that their weakness results primarily from the fact that this was actually a "time out" that the leadership took until it could reach an agreement.

[Answer] I can understand why the view is becoming public that the Draft Conclusions from the 13th session of the LCV Central Committee were a "time out" that the leadership took for itself until it could reach an agreement, and achieve a united position. The motives for this view are different, however, and they reflect various tendencies within the LCY, from dissatisfaction with the disunity of the LCY leadership, to the traditional passive waiting for the leadership to "agree" and send a directive or indicate what to do. At the meeting where I requested that we have a showdown with the differences among us--and this was accepted--I suggested that we initiate a public discussion on the situation in the party. At another meeting, I specified that this public discussion should be opened with one and a half to two pages of text that would explicitly list several questions that the party discussion should answer. The answers to these questions would certainly express many contradictions in the party, and this would make it possible for us to face the situation in the party more realistically and make a stronger start in the process of overcoming this situation. This did not go through, however.

Then came the 13th session of the LCY Central Committee, which was to a great extent prepared in the usual routine manner, with a draft of the conclusions that were to be adopted at the session itself. A commission of 15 of us was formed to modify these conclusions "on the basis of the discussion," so that they would be adopted at the session. Also on the commission were some members of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, and, as is well known, the conclusions were proposed by the Presidium. When the Central Committee began the proceedings, we held a meeting of the commission and after a serious discussion, we proposed that the conclusions not be adopted, simply because they were irrelevant, abstract, and general, and only continued what is routine and a matter of ritual in the LCY, while what the social situation requires is precisely a different approach, and a different seriousness and responsibility on the part of the party leadership. Some people reacted to that position, saying that there would be a schism between the Presidium and the Central Committee and that the Presidium would be almost discredited, since, allegedly, the Central Committee was rejecting the proposed conclusions. It was therefore demanded that the conclusions nevertheless be adopted. We on

the commission, however, said that we were a commission of the LCY Central Committee and that we did not have to submit an accounting for our work and our proposal. And then the process of "coordination" began. The result was a proposal that we not adopt the proposed conclusions, and that the commission, after a session and a discussion of the session of the Central Committee, propose conclusions, and that the Presidium "adopt them as a draft," with these proposals being the basis for a public discussion, since "a public discussion would not be possible without such conclusions."

It seems to me that the source of the virtues and weaknesses of these conclusions is somewhere in this process. But these proposals are only in draft form. Naturally, the possibility exists that they might be improved after the public discussion and that they might really be less routine and general, and more of a mobilizing force. But this possibility is yet to be confirmed.

But regardless of what the draft conclusions are like, we have nevertheless taken a step toward working differently, although it is insufficient. I need to add one more qualification to the criticism of the work of the LCY Central Committee. I am critical of this work, of course, but I also bear responsibility for it. I am aware, however, that many of the weaknesses in the Committee's work are not based in it, but deeper, if not so much in the entire party, then in the party structures at the "lower" levels. I cannot imagine that it is possible to formulate the methods and content of the LCY Central Committee's work more adequately without changing the way in which the "lower" leaderships work. I would therefore be satisfied if the steps that we are taking in the LCY Central Committee and the discussions that have been started were also showing up in the republic and provincial committees, but they have not. That is all the more reason why it seems to me that changes in working methods are not just a technical issue, and that this change has to be a profound one in the LC.

I do not mean to say that the LCY Central Committee does not have a specific responsibility for initiating these profound changes. I hope--and this request has been formulated in this public debate--that the LCY Central Committee will find the strength and ability to take the further steps necessary in this direction.

[Question] I know of quite a few instances when we have taken too long to investigate matters and adopt suitable positions. In this way we have not only lost time but actually made it possible for the negative processes to have broader and even overwhelming repercussions. In some cases the source of this delay could have been the party's tendency to lag behind real events and occurrences, but it is also an expression of the lack of self-criticism on the part of many of us in the party, who are not able to speak critically about our own abilities and our own "contributions" to party and social weaknesses.

[Answer] In regard to this, it can be stated that we in the leadership are not receptive enough to the criticism that exposes this, and that we take it very badly. I cannot imagine revitalizing the LC, however, without increasing the specific responsibility of the party leadership structures. The party of 1941, when there were ten thousand members, is often mentioned, but even in that party not everyone was equal in strategic insight into matters and in specific responsibility.

Even then, some people, and especially Tito, were strategically more accurate and had better insight, and on that basis they obtained the unity of the party. In spite of the altered historical circumstances, I do not see that the situation is any different now, especially with regard to social contradictions, which are exacerbated today, as well as in the rapid process of the party's becoming a mass organization, since the LCY is exposed to the corrosion and loss of its identity that I have already mentioned. This is another reason for enhancing the specific responsibility of the leadership structures. Here I am stressing, uncritically, [not] just the responsibility of the leadership structures for unity, but also the responsibility of the LCY base. I am not one of those who gives priority to one or the other, to the unity of the leadership or the unity of the LCY base, but I am seeking to have this responsibility spelled out.

[Question] It was noted a long time ago that the basic principle in the work of the LC--democratic centralism--does not work, or that it only works partially and in one direction. How can democratic centralism be conducted in practice when every attempt to touch upon "other people's affairs," or "other people's problems," is considered "rude" and politically harmful? I am not thinking here as much of any concrete situations, for example the White Book, as of the principle. Can the LCY act in a united manner if, for instance, every member of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee answers to his own Central Committee and not to the electoral base, the LCY Central Committee?

On top of this, there is a problem of cadre policy, since in the present situation the selection of the leadership does not depend on the membership, and responsibility is reduced to turning in circles, to self-reproduction.

[Answer] The problem of implementing democratic centralism is associated with the previously mentioned situation and relations within the party. I do not see how we can succeed in realizing the postulated nature of democratic centralism without changing these relations and this situation. The role of the LCY Central Committee in this regard is inadequate, but I think that this is less its fault than a consequence of the current relations in the party, for example, in the republics and provinces. This is another reason why profound changes should be made in these relations.

At any rate, as long as we in the Yugoslav leadership actually and formally hide behind the positions and the interests of "our own" republics and provinces, and as long as we do not stop the manner in which criticism of an individual in the LCY leadership is interpreted as criticism of his "base," so that then there cannot be any criticism, I do not think that it is possible to speak of achieving the necessary role and responsibility of the LCY leadership and the necessary content of democratic centralism.

If I were directly associated with cadre policy in the LC, then I would say that not only do we have to have a democratic and more responsible procedure in the selection of leadership cadres, which entails several candidates and a real and not formal selection of them, but also, at the national level, the people in the LCY leadership should really be selected at the national level, which requires that each candidate also be accepted by others in Yugoslavia and not just in his own area.

I am one of those who are convinced that with two and a half million members in the LCY, we have a higher quality ideological-theoretical and class potential than is evidenced in the real process of cadre policy. I think that the situation in the LCY that I mentioned is also directly reflected in cadre policy. The question is which backgrounds pass through and which are imposed, and what the abilities of these people are, i.e. what is demanded of them and what social structures they are from.

To the extent that the LC finds its support, for example, in a union with technobureaucratic structures, it is natural that people will be imposed who, if they are not "irreplaceable," satisfy the logic of this alliance. Furthermore, loyalty to such a course of events is often more essential than a critical approach to this practice.

[Question] Currently, polemics are also being conducted about Tito's initiative on collective leadership and responsibility, but as a rule they are limited to the length of the term of office. It is thus obvious that for some people the length of the term of office is extremely important, and this confirms once more that we have carried out this initiative of Tito's in form only. It is fact that only 35 opstinas in Croatia added to their statutes the first amendment to the republic's Constitution, and that it was all reduced to changing the 4-year terms to shorter ones. Only the facade has changed, and essentially nothing has changed.

[Answer] Also very significant is the attitude toward the essence of Tito's initiative, and the reduction of this initiative to the term of office and its length, not just because it is easier to talk about this and because the interest of individuals is more pronounced in this regard, but also because with the real existing relations that we have in the party, it is more difficult to fight for the spirit and substance of collective work and responsibility. Obviously this is a more long-term task, although, as can be seen today, there is an increasing tendency to deviate from it in the short term.

It is therefore not surprising that very often, in the existing collective work, we fabricate general, abstract, and repetitive positions and conclusions that as such are irrelevant, and we leave real involvement and activism to individuals, especially if they are an expression of "continuity" and "irreplaceability."

Consequently, people will always prefer to read what an individual thinks rather than what some body expressed in its communique or its conclusion. Sometimes it is more important in the collective leadership to accomplish the demands of the social, gender, or age structure, and less attention is devoted to the selection of people who through their mentality, to paraphrase Kardelj, and their individual creative abilities, will really ensure collective work and responsibility.

I am afraid that without a more determined and critical look into all this, the insistence on collective work and responsibility, as understood by Tito, will remain a mere ideological demand, and on the other hand, will as a consequence give rise to reluctance to engage in a deeper analysis of the implementation of this initiative, and a restrictive limitation of the analysis to the term of office and its length.

[Question] One often hears the question of whether the democratization of relations in the party is a precondition for strengthening democratic relations in society in general.

[Answer] It could be asserted that that is true, but in that case it is necessary to make some qualifications--first of all, what kind of democratization are we talking about?

It seems to me that even now we have two practices equally present in the LC: a democratic practice and an undemocratic practice. We have certain democratic practices in both the leadership structures and the party base. In the leadership, it is expressed through a process, little mentioned before, of weak collective expression, and pronounced individual clearness and involvement. I do not think that this type of democratization is particularly good.

[Question] Are you thinking of free competition?

[Answer] Yes, because it is half a step away from a race for prestige and a hierarchy of influence and importance for individuals in society. It gives rise to impatience and non-comradely relations in society.

On the other hand, democratization is frequently expressed in party life as the "right" of individuals and organizations, while voicing ideological allegiance, to legally deviate in their work and life from the party policy and positions without any consequences or differentiation.

I cannot imagine the struggle for the revitalization and unity of the LC to be possible without an effective differentiation within the LC with respect to this process and those who are responsible for it. Naturally, I do not think that such a "democratization" in the LC is good.

What is it that is undemocratic in the party? It is the one-way flow between the leadership and the base. In spite of our principles, which we support in general, the LC's positions and the concrete steps that it takes or gives its support to are not a subject for discussion in the LC; this gives rise to two negative consequences--the reliance of the LC leadership structures on executive-contractor and technobureaucratic structures, which in any case exert pressure on the LC, and the feeling among the membership at large that they really do not create party policy, and that they are not able to examine problems "as a whole," which is then also a powerful stimulus for irresponsibility.

It therefore seems to me that the demand for a democratization of relations in the party has to be based more on the real situation and relations in the party. Otherwise, this demand will remain ineffective and more of a political alibi for its advocates being active and progressive.

[Question] Recently, one could have gotten the impression that we are not adhering enough to Tito's basic ideas. This could be illustrated by the example of his initiative on collective work and responsibility, but also Tito's demand for several candidates, which was also a conclusion of the 1th Congress, is nowhere near starting to be implemented. On the other hand, there are also views that having several candidates would constitute bourgeois democracy, in which the candidates would present different programs, while our party has only one program; and furthermore, that we seem to have forgotten Tito's method of dealing with factions. Would it be possible to speak of a deviation from Tito's ideas and working methods?

[Answer] It is really paradoxical how poor our understanding is of the nature of Tito's work, his attitude toward reality and its revolutionary transformation. This does not just apply to the appearance of deviations from Tito's ideas, or rather attacks on them, but also above all to the poor understanding of his working methods, particularly within the leadership of the LC. Tito's ideas and methods for revolutionary activity came to be expressed in the continuity of our revolution, and were expressed in a sublimated manner through his historic initiatives, following an inherent and consistent revolutionary line.

Possibly his role in the Yugoslav revolution was so significant, tremendous, and comprehensive that many of us are not able to understand and assimilate it in its essence and its full scope. In the development of our revolution, Tito was also faced with specific conditions and limitations, but he never backed away or ran from these concrete historical circumstances. On the contrary, he contributed to finding the optimum that, along a consistent course, fulfilled the strategy of the Yugoslav party and revolution under the existing circumstances, and that is what is most important.

In this regard, it is not without significance that his initiatives were understood by broad strata of workers and working people, even when this was poorly manifested in the leadership structures. I think that therefore, at this time Tito's methods of leadership and initiative in the socialist transformation of society are becoming more significant, especially when we are aware of what fraternity and unity, the decisive role of the working class, and self-management mean for this country today. It is quite certain, for example, that the essence of Tito's idea of collective leadership and responsibility cannot be reduced--nor did he reduce them--to the function of providing some sort of insurance against leaderism and a struggle for power in the post-Tito period.

Obviously, his idea was not understood by those who are interpreting it that way. They did not understand that this idea of his is just one more historic initiative, without which there could be no further step in the development of socialist self-management or the fulfillment of the declared role of the party in our system. Therefore, this is not only a question of the attitude toward Tito's initiative, but also of resistance to the creation of the prerequisites without which there cannot be any way out of the social crisis, or any revitalization of the LC.

Even today, one can learn a great deal from Tito's method in the struggle for the party and the struggle against factions in the LC. The essence of it is his consistency. I could now make an essay excursion from 1928 until today, but let us just stress that the care of Tito's method was facing up to the real situation, and articulating a clear platform for getting out of that situation. His struggle for the unity of the party not only presupposed a differentiation within the LC, but also a struggle for people. Because of this it was possible to get the optimum from people, the way they are. It is quite certain, however, that the neglect of this method of Tito's is not accidental, just as the deviation from his ideas and platform in the development of our socialist community is not accidental. It is also important to state this because there are also people among us who limit their understanding of Tito's ideas and methods to the place and role that Tito had in our revolution, and "for the sake of continuity" wish for such a role for themselves, without having even nearly adequate historical and personal prerequisites for this. I think that all of this is a sufficient reason for persisting in the struggle to fulfill Tito's idea of collective work and responsibility.

I am certain, however, that we will have to go back to this significance and the method of Tito's work for a long time yet, especially if what we are immersed in now is stirred up to some extent. That is also another reason for us to go back to our sources.

9909

CSO: 2800/164

YUGOSLAVIA

PROSECUTOR IN 'DACHAU TRIALS' DENIES RESPONSIBILITY

AU070920 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 85 p 4

[Report by J. Pjevic]

[Excerpts] Ljubljana, 29 Jan--The organic links and mutual intertwinement of the revolutionary past, of the present and future time was fully expressed in the debate of 30 delegates at the program session of the Republican Conference of the SAWP of Slovenia that has just ended.

Vladimir Krivic related his speech to the contention Franc Setinc made in the introductory speech saying: "If, on the occasion of the repeated elucidation of the 'Dachau trials,' [1984 trial (and conviction) in Yugoslavia of former Dachau inmates who were prewar communists on charges of having collaborated with the Nazis, a trial later acknowledged by the Yugoslav authorities to have been a mistake] the political leadership said that certain mistakes had been made that we can only regret, that does not mean that it will allow the revolution to be presented as a mixture of nothing but mistakes and that it should be put in the dock, in part or even as a whole, and divested of any value."

This formulation is perhaps accidentally one-sided, Krivic thinks, and I cannot completely agree that what was involved were only individual mistakes. One should try to see where these mistakes came from and that what was primarily involved was violation of legal regulations that were in force at the time by the investigation service. I know this very well, because that was the time when I was appointed public prosecutor in that trial, and appointed a few days before, without any possibility of thorough preparation. That time the investigation service presented to the public prosecutor and the court completely forged documents and extorted statements that did not correspond to the actual situation. [no quotation marks as published]

In short, according to Krivic, what was involved was the violation of legal regulations "for which we all know that those who are guilty have no criminal responsibility any more, because the matter has expired under the statute of limitations, but there is moral and political responsibility. That is why I wrote on one occasion that such comrades should not be members of the party any more and the matter should be assessed from this aspect, because such methods of the investigation service led to the public prosecutor's office and court being deluded and thereby such disastrous mistakes ensued."

However, in connection with this assessment of Krivic's, one could ask whether it is fair that the whole blame and responsibility be placed on the investigation service alone, that is, did the public prosecutor's office and the court not have any possibility to establish the actual situation, which was their basic duty, because if they did not, the trial should not have been held? The question is also asked why Krivic now claims that he did not have time to prepare, that is, why did he not demand that the trial be adjourned, or refuse to prosecute the suit under such conditions?

CSO: 2800/214

END